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I . INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
Acquiring major weapons systems requires that a
multitude of trade-off decisions be made. Common decisions
made by acquisition managers relate trade-offs between
cost, schedule, technical performance, and operational
suppor tab i 1 i ty
.
Acquisition managers must make trade-off decisions in
the "real world" of uncertainty. In this sense,
acquisition managers will have to rely more and more on the
capabilities of computer assistance to apply mathematical
models to the "real world" of major weapon system
acquisition to enhance their capability to make informed
and intelligent trade-off decisions.
Many changes are taking place in the defense
acquisition world. Acquisition managers have few tools
currently available for systematically and effectively
analyzing "what if" contracting scenarios. Major weapon
system costs are high and today's acquisition and contract
managers don't often apply incentives to reduce costs
because they don't have the proper tools to make innovative
trade-off decisions efficiently.
A Life Cycle Contracting (LCC) model has been developed
by Dan C. Boger, Carl R. Jones, and Kevin C. Sontheimer.
This LCC model correlates some of the major acquisition
trade-off criteria such as budget available, production
experience curves, production quantities, contract types,
and the competitive costs of doing business. The
relationships have been correlated into a mathematical
model which will be useful in making key contract strategy
dec i s i ons
.
An analysis of the LCC model characteristics provides
useful insight into the ways a contracting officer may
change the key variables of a contracting strategy decision
in the production phase of the acquisition cycle.
Effective use of this model will affect more advantageous
costs and negotiating positions for the government.
Results of "what if" changes to planned production
contract strategy decisions are analyzed and their
usefulness to the contracting officer in developing
incentives to reduce total acquisition costs to the
government is assessed.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The primary objective of this research is to analyze
the Life Cycle Contracting (LCC) model developed by Dan C.
Boger, Carl R. Jones, and Kevin C. Sontheimer in their
paper "Life Cycle Contracting is the Corollary of Life
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Cycle Costing". The analysis assesses the utility of the
model in major weapon systems acquisition.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is: How might the Life
Cycle Contracting (LCC) model be utilized by contracting
officers to procure major aerospace weapon systems?
Secondary questions addressed are:
1. What are the basic assumptions under which the model
was developed?
2. What are the major characteristics of the factors in
the LCC model and how are they related?
3. Is there current literature to support the
relationships and assumptions of the model?
4. Which LCC model factors will provide the most utility
based on sensitivity to change?
5. How might these most sensitive factors be used to
negotiate contract prices?
6. Can the model be altered to include competitively
procured contracts?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis is limited to an analysis of
the LCC model as published. Application of the LCC model
was made in as many "real world" situations as possible,
limited only by the reasonab i 1 i ty of documented historical
parameters and assumptions. Shipbuilding industry
assumptions may vary significantly from aerospace industry
assumptions. To limit the scope of the application of this
model, aerospace industry assumptions are developed and
supported. It is presumed that the shipbuilding industry
supported assumptions could also be applied in the LCC
mode 1
.
This study did not attempt to analyze cost estimating
models nor to expand the analysis of the LCC model beyond
its published assumptions except to explore possible
applications of the model to non-sole source contracting
scenarios. Personal interviews were limited to
clarification of the LCC model by its authors and
corroboration of assumptions with key Navy acquisition
managers and other selected acquisition professionals.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology used in this study consisted
of a comprehensive analysis of the published LCC model. A
literature review identified existing support for the LCC
assumptions and relationships. The literature base was
collected through the Naval Postgraduate School library,
the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE),
the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), and
various private libraries.
Model parameters and assumptions were verified by




Various contracting scenarios were analyzed using the
LCC model as a decision tool. Contracting scenarios were
developed based on currently accepted and practiced
contract strategies and methodologies. A sensitivity
analysis was performed by changing LCC parameters and
assumptions and comparing the results.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The Introduction provides the reader with a general
description of this research effort. Chapter Two consists
of a basic description of the LCC model characteristics and
assumptions. Chapter Three identifies and describes the
LCC factors and relationships between them and identifies
the supporting literature which corroborates the
relationships. Chapter Four develops the contracting
scenarios which were used in the LCC model and documents
the assumptions made in each iteration of the "what if"
sensitivity analysis. Chapter Five reports the results of
the sensitivity analysis and provides suggestions for
altering the common contracting scenarios to affect a
contracting strategy for the government. Included are
suggestions for altering the LCC model to accommodate
competitive procurement. Chapter Six provides a synopsis
of the findings and uses them to develop conclusions to the
11
question of how the LCC model can be utilized by
contracting officers to procure major weapon systems
Limitations of the findings are discussed as well as
recommendations for further research.
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I I . THE LCC MODEL: CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The basic assumptions of the LCC model are developed to
address the relationship among the government, the
contractor, and the contract. The contract is used to
identify the level of risk which each party of the contract
is willing to assume. [Ref. 1]
A. THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
The decision trade-offs made by acquisition managers
prioritize and integrate many requirements of a major
weapon system program.
Acquisition managers must be able to select from
alternative choices throughout the acquisition cycle and
make critical decisions during windows of opportunity to
provide a coordinated approach to achieving program
objectives economically and effectively. [Ref. 23
The LCC model attempts to consider the effects of
budget fluctuations, learning curves, production
quantities, contract types, and the competitive cost of
doing business on the life cycle production cost of buying
a major weapon system [Ref. 31.
By using this life cycle model, contract type
assumptions can be made and fit into the model as
parameters. An equation can thus be formulated which is
representative of the actual cost of the production
contract. In this way, the LCC model can be used to
13
enhance the information needed to make rational
requirements trade-off decisions.
B. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE "SYSTEM"
The LCC model was developed to "establish effective
cost control over (the) program costs" of a major weapon
system [Ref. 41. Systemic problems are identified in the
development of the LCC model.
1. Major weapon system acquisitions often occur in
highly customized, sole supplier contracting scenarios.
2. Production time profiles are established early in the
development of the acquisition strategy and are usually
determined long before actual costs, budget figures, or
production schedules and other risk factors are known.
The production time span is effectively fixed for
production phase trade-off decisions.
3. A major weapon system acquisition budget is developed
apart from the acquisition strategy. Key milestones in
the acquisition strategy address resource requirements
but budget formulation and the ultimate appropriation of
resources is done outside the acquisition process.
Funding levels available for any major weapon system
production contract are known to the general public
before a contract is solicited.
4. Aerospace industry prime contractors do not interact
with the government as "true competitors" but as
"quas i -monopo 1 i es"-- f ew suppliers, one buyer [Ref. 51.
Overstaffing in engineering divisions may help to ensure
"leading edge technology"; however, unnecessary defense
quality, reliability, and maintainability requirements
add needlessly to the overall costs of major weapons
systems. The defense aerospace weapon system
acquisitions are apparently made at "less than arms
length". Normal competitive pressures do not apply in
the LCC model assumptions. [Ref. 6]
The LCC model considers that discretionary costs are
charged to defense contracts .in excess of minimum cost
14
levels because strict cost controls are not applied. The
LCC model refers to these costs as "convenience costs"
because it is convenient and expedient for the government
and the contractor to charge all costs to specific pools
and not worry excessively about the bottom line cost of
major weapon system contracts. There is little competitive
or governmental pressure to minimize convenience costs at
each cost incurrence level. [Ref. 73
C. ASSUMPTIONS ARE DEFINED THROUGH RELATIONSHIPS
The LCC model recognizes that technology changes
rapidly in the aerospace defense industry. Production and
direct labor baselines can become meaningless over a
relatively short time span. It is extremely difficult to
determine when high costs are too high for a specified
major weapon system. [Ref. 81
The LCC model addresses the production contract time
span problem as it relates to historically cooperative
contracting arrangements. Contracts are performed at less,
than arms length for the convenience of both the government
acquisition manager and the defense contractors [Ref. 93.
The LCC model links the "less than arms length"
relationship between the government and the contractor with
the federal budget process. Funding uncertainties are
introduced both before and after acquisition strategy
contracting decisions are made [Ref. 103.
15
Budgeting considerations include the fact that
historical unit costs are often used to estimate future
funding requirements. Production quantities are often
established with little or no regard for the effect of
changes in production lot sizes on the total cost of the
production cycle. Further, it is assumed that a relative
change in production unit cost is proportional to a change
in the production lot size.
The LCC model assumes that major weapon system
production runs are made by a single source, so potential
competition is absent from the model. [Ref. 11]
The LCC model treats the government as an entity with
no specified management objectives [Ref. 123. The closest
objective realizable in a trade-off analysis would be the
program objectives of the major weapon system program. In
dealing with government decision making, the assumption
made is that there is no one person or group who has the
authority or responsibility for the achievement of major
weapon system program objectives.
D. THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS
The LCC model explores the hypothesis that, because the
defense contractors historically perform under a sequence
of annual contracts as sole source producers, the
contractor will (or will not) control the amount of
convenience costs incurred based on, first, the type of
16
incentive arrangements built in to the contract and,
second, the amount of funding known to be available for
that particular contract.
Of primary concern in this (LCC model) analysis are the
parameters which are explicitly part of the contract: the
cost-sharing ratio and the incentive fee ratio (profit
ratio). By postulating reasonable values for the
remaining (LCC model) parameters, one can determine what
combinations of these two principle parameters will
result in a positive incentive for contractors to incur
convenience costs. [Ref. 131
Results of changes in these two key parameters can also
be used to identify contract negotiating parameters for the
acquisition managers. The remaining parameter values can
easily be tailored to fit known contracting scenarios.
The LCC model characteristics and assumptions are made
within the complex triad of the government, the contract,
and the defense contractor. The incentives are developed
through the contract to provide a positive environment to
keep the costs to a minimum level.
E. THE CONTRACT TYPES
Major aids available to the contracting manager are the
wide variety of contract types with which he can acquire
the required equipment. To select the best contract type
for a particular buy, the contract manager must consider
all available contract types and the factors which
influence his use of each type. [Ref. 14j
The following descriptions of contract types are
provided as background to enable an understanding of the
17
types of tradeoff decisions which must be made by the
contracting officer.
A FFP contract is defined as a contract for which the
price is agreed to before a definitive contract is
awarded. The price remains for the life of the contract
unless revised within the "changes clause" of the
contract. Because the price is fixed, the contractor
assumes full cost responsibility and the contractor's cost
share is defined to be 100 percent. [Ref. 15]
A firm fixed price contract is suitable for acquiring
commercial products or commercial type products ... on
the basis of reasonably definite functional or detailed
specifications. When (1) there is adequate price
competition; (2) there are reasonable price comparisons
with prior purchases, similar supplies or services made
on a competitive basis or supported by valid cost or
pricing data; (3) available cost or pricing information
permits realistic estimates of the probable costs of
performance; or (4) performance uncertainties can be
identified and reasonable estimates of their cost impact
can be made, and the contractor is willing to accept firm
fixed price representing assumption of the risks
involved. [Ref. 161
The Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract is defined
as a pre-arranged agreement between the buyer and the
seller on a contract fee to be adjusted based on the
relationship of total actual cost and the total target cost
of executing the work required by the RFP . Target costs
are established in the contract as well as a cost share
ratio which is used to increase or decrease the
contractor's share of cost whenever actual costs differ
from the target cost. [Ref. 17]
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A CPIF contract is appropriate for development and test
programs when (1) a cost reimbursement contract is
necessary and . . . (2) a target cost and fee adjustment
formula can be negotiated that are likely to motivate the
contractor to manage effectively .... The fee
adjustment formula should provide an incentive that will
be effective over the full range of reasonably
foreseeable variations from target cost. If a high
maximum fee is negotiated, the contract shall also
provide for a low minimum fee that may be a zero fee or,
in rare cases, a negative fee. [Ref. 18]
The share of risk associated with a CPIF contract is
dependent on the degree of confidence held in the results
of the development and testing phase of the acquisition
process
.
The Fixed Price Incentive (firm target) (FPIF) contract
is defined as a contract where the target cost, target
profit, target price, price ceiling, and cost share are
developed at the outset of the contract. Upon completion
of the contract, actual (allowable) costs are analyzed,
totaled, and compared to the target cost figure. The final
contract price includes the allowable costs and incentive
fees, but cannot exceed the price ceiling agreed to in the
contract. [Ref. 19]
A FPIF contract is generally used when exact pricing is
impossible due to limitations in known production methods
or expected scheduling problems [Ref. 20].
This type of contract has its greatest application in the
purchase of high-cost, long-run production items.
[Ref. 211
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This contract type may be used only when (1) the
contractor's accounting system is adequate for providing
data to support negotiation of final cost of incentive
price revision; (2) adequate cost or pricing information
for establishing reasonable firm targets is available at
the time of initial contract negotiation; (3) the
determination and findings must be signed showing that
this contract type is likely to be less costly than any
other type or that it is impractical to obtain supplies
or services . . . without the use of this contract type.
[Ref. 221
The Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contract is defined as a
cost type contract that provides for a fixed fee amount as
well as an award amount which can be earned based on the
degree to which the contractor satisfies the buyer with the
performance of the contract. The award fee is sufficiently
large to motivate the contract to excel in areas such as
cost control, delivery schedules, technical innovation, and
quality. The amount paid from the award fee available is
subjectively determined by the buyer based on a judgemental
evaluation of the contractor's performance in predetermined
contract areas and is not subject to dispute by the
contractor. [Ref. 231
A Cost Plus Award Fee contract is suitable for use when
(i) the work to be performed is such that it is neither
feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective
incentive targets applicable to cost, technical
performance, or schedule; (ii) The likelihood of meeting
acquisition objectives will be enhanced by using a
contract that effectively motivates the contractor toward
exceptional performance and provides the government with
the flexibility to evaluate both actual performance and
conditions under which it was achieved; and (iii) any
additional administrative effort and cost required to
monitor and evaluate performance are justified by the
expected benefits .... The maximum fee payable (i.e.,
the base fee plus the highest potential award fee)... (has
statutory) limitations .... [Ref. 241
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Since the award fee determination is subjectively
derived, it would be difficult to foresee what its relation
would be to other cost factors. For this reason, the CPAF
was not used to develop the contracting scenarios in this
analysis. Inclusion would involve developing a
hypothetical relationship between the award fee and other
cost factors based on specific research of award fee
contracting relationships. Inclusion of the CPAF contract
in the analysis of the LCC model is outside the scope of
thi s thes i s
.
A purely competitive contracting scenario would result
from a government Invitation For Bid (IFB). Industry's
response to I FB ' s normally results in the award of a Firm
Fixed Price (FFP) contract.
If an IFB is not the appropriate means for soliciting a
proposal, a Request For Proposal (RFP) can be issued which
results in acceptable "competitive" bids being submitted
for the work solicited. Industry's response to an RFP can
result in contracts ranging from the FFP contract all the
way to a cost type contract, depending on the degree of
risk and/or uncertainty perceived to be associated with the
proposal
.
The Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984
amended the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.
21
CICA guidelines for the use of specific contract types are
1 isted below. [Ref . 251
Sealed bids must be used if:
Time permits solicitation, submission, and evaluation
of sealed bids;
Award will be made on the basis of price and other
price-related factors;
It is not necessary to conduct discussions; and
There is a reasonable expectation of receiving more
than one sealed bid.
Otherwise, competitive proposals shall be requested. There
are seven circumstances under which "other than competitive
procedures" may be used:
Property or services are available from only one source
and no other type of property or services will satisfy
the needs of the agency (includes follow-ons and
unsolicited research proposals);
The agency's need is of such unusual and compelling
urgency that the United States would be seriously injured
unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of
sources (must still obtain maximum competition
pract i cab 1 e)
;
It is necessary to award to a particular source/sources
in order to maintain a facility in case of national
emergency or to achieve industrial mobilization or to
establish or maintain an essential engineering, research,
or development capability provided by an educational or
other non-profit institution or a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center;
It is required by the terms of an international
agreement or treaty or by written direction of a foreign
government who is reimbursing the agency for the cost of
the procurement;
The statute expressly authorizes or requires
procurement through another agency or from a specified
source, or the agency's need is for a brand-name
commercial item for authorized resale;
22
Disclosure °f the agency's needs would compromise
national security unless the number of sources is limited
(must still obtain maximum practicable competition); or
The head of an agency determines it is necessary in the
public interest to use other than competitive procedures
and gives Congress 30 days written notice before award.
Considering C I CA guidelines in relation to the LCC
model, it is apparent that the model was developed to deal
with the exceptions to a competitive procurement scenario.
Follow-on production contracts for major weapon systems
or components fall into the sole source exception category
or the industrial base exception category. During a
National Contract Manager's Association, Monterey Peninsula
Chapter meeting at the Naval Postgraduate School, Captain
Peter DeMayo, Commander of Contracts at the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR)-, said that 7 billion dollars of
the 13 billion dollars worth of NAVAIR major weapon systems
contract dollars are spent for follow-on production. These
buys are considered to be exceptions to full and open
competition under CICA. [Ref. 261
The LCC model parameters are numerous and complex. It
is important to be able to select the appropriate
parameters with which a specific contract scenario can be
developed. Application of reasonable relationships,
estimates, and ranges for the defined parameters is
necessary. The objective of this research is to apply
these LCC model assumptions and parameters in common
contracting scenarios and to gain some insight into the
23
effects of different trade-off decisions on the total cost
to the government.
The next chapter will specifically identify and
describe the LCC model factors and their relationships, and
identify the supporting literature behind the assumptions
and parameter ranges.
24
III. THE LCC FACTORS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS
A. THE SOURCE
The following description of the LCC factors and
relationships is provided based on the Boger, Jones, and
Sontheimer report "Life Cycle Contracting is the Corollary
to Life Cycle Costing 1 * tRef. 271. Supporting literature




The assumptions were developed in the prior chapter and
are represented here as relationships between several key
factors. These factors can be quantified in a number of
different contracting scenarios.
The factors will be listed as they appear in the
overall defense contractor profit relationship. Underlined
titles identify the factors that make up the relationships.
Contractor Expected Return = [cost share *
(proposed cost (t) - actual cost (t))l + (1)
(profit ratio * proposed cost (t))
Identification of the factors included in the
relationship (1) follow:








is next period (year).
Contractor profit is the amount the contractor expects to
realize on the production contract over and above his
proposed cost. The contractor profit is the value the
contractor places on a production contract and is based
on the profit he expects to realize.
Cost share is the percentage of the difference between
the actual cost and the proposed cost that is the
contractor's responsibility to pay. Ranges of
appropriate cost shares used in the application of this
model are assigned based on discussions with
acquisition/contract professionals (as documented by
Table 2)
.
Prof i t rat i o is a percent which, in this model, is
multiplied by the Proposed Cost (defined below) to get an
estimate of the amount of profit that is expected to be
earned on the contract.
Proposed cost is the contractor's proposed cost in this
period (t). The proposed cost is a relationship of
several factors which must be described separately before
proposed cost can be understood.
Proposed Cost (t) = budget factor *
learning factor * actual cost (t-1) * (2)
'/. change in quantity this year over last year
Identification of the factors included in the
relationship (2) follow:
Budget factor is the percent of the budget received over
or under the amount requested. For example, if the
budget request was $2 million and the amount of funding
provided in the appropriation was $1.8 million, the
budget factor would be 90 percent. This factor is
significant because the assumption is that prior
knowledge of the budget available will influence the
amount of proposed costs submitted by the contractor.
Learning factor is the rate at which the unit cost of a
product decreases as more units of the product are made.
For example, the aerospace industry average cost is
reduced by approximately 80 percent as the production
quantity doubles [Ref. 281. This cost reduction is
attributed to production efficiency gained in the
26
learning process. The learning factor is used
extensively in government procurement and is known
commonly as the learning curve, the experience curve, or
the experience factor.
Actual cost ( t-1
)
is the actual cost of production during
the previous time period. This factor is made up of two
other factors which will be described in the actual cost
rel at i onship (4)
.
The last factor to be described in relationship (2)
foil ows
:
Percent change in quantity is the rate of production this
year as compared to last year.
% Change in Quantity = quantity (t) (3)
quant i ty ( t- 1
)
where t = this period (year)
and t-1 = last period(year)
The next factor to appear in relationship (1) is actual
cost, described as follows:
Actual cost = Total Cost Factor * (4)
Proposed cost
Identification of the factors included in the
relationship (4) follow:
Total Cost Factor . This factor is input to be able to
implement the model in the real world of unknown actual
costs by the government. Assuming that the type of
contract to be used is known, relative ranges of cost
share and profit ratios can be applied by the government
to the proposed cost to derive the contractor's estimate
of actual cost. The contractor estimates his actual cost
and assigns his assumed factors for cost share and profit
ratio to derive a proposed cost which he submits to the
government in response to the contract solicitation.
Since the government does not know the contractor's true
actual cost estimate, the total cost of the contract to
the government can be derived as a relationship between
the known or assumed cost share and profit ratio factors:
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Price Ceiling (or Proposed Cost + Maximum Fee)=
actual cost + (profit ratio * proposed cost) (5)
+ cost share * (proposed cost - actual cost)
where
,
Profit Ratio * Proposed Cost = (6)
contractor's target profit
and,
Cost Share * (Proposed Cost - Actual Cost) = (7)
cost incentive fee for FP I
F
Cost Share * (Actual Cost - C*t) =
cost incentive fee for CPIF
Note that since CPIF target cost is unknown to the
government until negotiations are final, C*t is used as the
minimum cost. C*t (relationship (11) below) represents the
government "going in u negotiating cost and is used here to
identify the maximum incentive fee liability the government
could incur in a CPIF contracting scenario.
Combining the relationships (5, 6 and 7) yields the
Total Cost Factor which will be multiplied by contractor's
proposed costs to derive a reasonable government estimate
of the contractor's actual costs:
Total Cost Factor * Proposed Cost =
Actual Cost + contractor's target profit (8)
+ cost incentive fee
28




Price ceiling = (120 percent) * proposed costs (9)
Relationship (9) is commonly set based on the
experience of the acquisition manager.
FP I arrangements specify ceiling amounts that are the
upper limits to any adjustment in price .... The best
way to set a ceiling is to look at . . . the maximum
amount of dollars of cost you would be willing to pay and
the profit you would consider reasonable at that cost
level. [Ref. 291
Considering this guidance, the LCC model depicts a
reasonable price ceiling relationship.
CPIF contracts are limited by the amount of total fee
to be paid upon settlement of the contract. CPIF actual
costs are not limited by an upper bound per se, but are
monitored throughout contract execution. Because it is
immpossible to evaluate a contracting scenario based on an
unlimited cost reimbursement, this researcher assumed a
limit within which CPIF contract cost plus incentive fee
can be modeled and analyzed.
Maximum Fee = (20 percent) * Proposed Cost (10)
This assumption is made to be able to apply the LCC model
factors to a CPIF contracting scenario and is not supported
in contracting regulation or literature as an approved
limitation of CPIF contract parameters. The acquisition
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manager can only apply the remaining LCC model factors to
predict contractor's actual cost by limiting the CPIF
contract total price to 120 percent times the proposed
cost
.
The total price to the government is limited in the LCC
model because the amount of funding available for
production is limited by the budget available. By knowing
the budget ahead of time, the contractor can maximize his
profit by assuming that he will get the maximum available
price or cost plus fee.
C. INCENTIVE CONTRACTING IS CONSIDERED
The LCC model depicts the government's "going in"
negotiating cost as C*t, the minimum attainable cost
level. As used by the government contracting officer:
C*t is the "going in" negotiating cost; the minimum
actual cost the government would expect to pay under the
contract
.
C*t = learning factor * actual cost (t-1) (11)
* % change Quantity
Relationship (11) is similar to the proposed cost
relationship (2) except that it considers the actual costs
last year without factoring in the effects of known funding
levels (budget factor).
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The Total Cost Factor (relationship (8)) is limited in
an incentive contracting arrangement by a price ceiling in
a FPI contract. For LCC model application purposes, the
CPIF total price is limited by an assumed maximum, thus
limiting the Total Cost Factor (relationship (8)) for a
CPIF contract as well.
The Price ceiling and the maximum CPIF price are
further assumed, in the LCC model, to be limited by the
funds available in the production program (budget). All of
these limitations are summarized and dealt with as the Net
Incentive Factor (NIF) relationship:
NIF = (cost share* pro f i t rat i o ) *budget factor* 1 earn i ng
1 + contractor's discount rate
* Quantity (t+1) - cost share (12)
Quant i ty t
Factors included in relationship (12) which have not yet
been described follow:
Contractor's discount rate is the rate at which the
contractor values his cost of capital. The contractor's
discount rate is usually tied to the contractor's
internally required rate of return on capital investments
CRef. 301.
(quantity ( t+ 1 ) /quant i ty (t) represents the percentage of
planned change in the production quantity next year.
This figure is common knowledge to contractors and is
used to develop the proposed cost.
Restating relationship (1), the contractor's expected
net return is a function of the cost share, profit ratio,
contractor's discount rate, learning factor, budget factor,
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and the quantity of production expected for the next year
based on this year's production quantity. The NIF
demonstrates how combinations of these factors can alter
the contractor's cost incurrence incentive.
The basic assumptions of the LCC model support the
concept that if the NIF is greater than zero then higher
profits will result if the contractor increases his actual
costs to equal the budget available by easing control over
convenience costs. If the NIF is less than zero, lower
profits will result if the contractor increases his actual
costs by decreasing control of convenience costs.
The acquisition manager's objective should be to
develop a set of contract parameters which result in a
positive incentive (negative value of the NIF) to reduce
actual costs incurred.
D. CONTRACTOR BEHAVIOR IS CONSIDERED
To complete the description of the LCC model factors
and their relationships, government acquisition managers'
expectations must be taken into account. The government
expects to receive a proposed cost which considers the
factors in relationship (2). The contracting manager must
try to predict, in advance of negotiations and/or award,
the amount of costs which will actually be incurred by the
contractor. He must estimate actual costs to be able to
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establish appropriate incentives and limitations within the
bounds of the contracting instrument.
By approximately predicting actual costs, the
contracting officer can analyze the degree to which
manipulation of the other factors in relationship (2) can
cause a negative NIF for the contractor. The purpose of
manipulating the factors is to cause the contractor and the
government to act in a way which will cause the least
possible actual cost to be incurred in the execution of the
contract
.
E. CONTRACT TYPES LIMIT FACTORS
The remaining factors and relationships used in the LCC
model are the limitations imposed by the use of different
contract types. A FFP contract requires that the price be
established in advance. There is no room for manipulating
profit except by over or under estimating actual costs
incurred in the prior year. Prior year production costs or
historical data are often used to predict the actual
production costs to be incurred this period. These
estimates are then used to establish the contractor's
profit on the contract.
In incentive contracting arrangements costs are limited
by minimum and/or maximum boundaries. The LCC model
depicts the government's "going in" negotiating cost as
C*t; the cost expected to be paid by the government.
33
The LCC model factors and their relationships have been
provided in detail. A legend of the relationships and
their abbreviations is provided as Table 1. The
abbreviated titles of the factors and relationships will be
used in the next chapter and in the computer application.
The next chapter develops the contracting scenarios and
documents the decision trade-offs that were made to
demonstrate each iteration of the sensitivity analysis.
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TABLE 1
LEGEND OF RELATIONSHIP ABBREVIATIONS
RELATIONSHIP ABBREVIATIONS
1 Exp. return = cost share * (Cpt-Cat)
+ (profit* * Cpt)
2 Cpt = budget * learning * (Cat-1)
* 7.changeQt
3 %changeQt = Qt/Qt-1
4 Cat = TCFactor * Cpt
But since the government doesn't know the
contractor's Cat, relationship 8 is used
to derive a Total Cost Factor and
approximate Cat.
5 Ceiling or (Cpt+MaxFee) =
Cat > (profit* * Cpt)
+ cost share * (Cpt-Cat)
--note--TCFactor*Cpt is limited by price ceiling in FP I
F
and Cpt + MaxFee in CPIF
6 *Profit = profit'/. * (Cpt)
7 FPIF INCFEE = cost share * (Cpt-Cat)
CPIF INCFEE = cost share * (Cat-C*t)
8 TCFactor * Cpt = Cat + *Profit + INCFEE
9 Ceiling = 1207. * Cpt (FPIF assumption)
10 MaxFee = 207. * Cpt (CPIF assumption)
11 C*t = learning * Cat-1 * 7.changeQt
12 NIF = [((cost share + profit*) * budget
* learning) / (1 + discount*)] *
[ (Qt+1 )/Qtl - cost share
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IV. THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A. TODAY'S ACQUISITION PROCESS
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy Shipbuilding and
Logistics (ASN,S+L), Everett Pyatt, summarizes today's
acquisition process in a memorandum to the Secretary of the
Navy:
. . . The process as I see it today . . . [is]
overcontro 1 1 ed by a complex maze of laws and regulations
that apply to contracts large and small. In 1972 the
Commission on Government Procurement identified more than
4,000 provisions of federal law related to procurement.
These laws and interpretations of both laws and
regulations through court cases, board cases, and GAO
protest decisions occupy 1,152 linear feet of book
shelves in our contract law library. Clearly, nobody
understands them all. [Ref. 31]
Secretary Pyatt said of the non-competitive contracting
process
:
In procurements that are not price competitive,
establishing the appropriate cost is the problem.
Agreeing on the cost of an item becomes an excercise in
auditing, analyzing, and adding up the various elements
to project the contract cost. Added to the basic
contract cost are profit, cost of money and allowances
for general and administrative overhead, which is the
current headline issue in contracting. In contracts not
awarded on the basis of price competition, the cost must
be negotiated, and therein lies a tremendous advantage
for the contractor. The contractor knows his cost far
better than we ever will, and he knows our budget and the
pressures we are under to obligate it. [Ref. 32]
The contractor has an advantage of prior knowledge at
the negotiating table. The contracting officer must
establish a target cost based on historical cost, vigorous
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cost analysis, or estimates of what the contract "should
cost" given that the contractor produces efficiently
(efficiency is defined by government "should cost"
estimates). Difficult and complex cost analyses are
required to arrive at an advantageous "going in" cost for
the government negotiator.
Unfortunately, these decisions are made in a vacuum of
the current contract, or "this year's" contract [Ref. 333.
During the telephone interviews, this researcher found no
evidence to indicate that results of negotiations on a
current production contract were applied to the acquisition
strategy to determine how the contract type, profit ratio,
share line, or quantity contracted for current production
would affect the total cost to the government in future
production periods for that major weapon system.
Interviews with current acquisition and contract
managers indicated that long term acquisition strategy
trade-off decisions are not made to access the total
effects of each year's production contract parameters. A
high rate of turnover of government acquisition managers,
coupled with the complexity of regulations that affect
trade-off decisions, add to the lack of long term concern
for the "total cost to the government".
Acquisition policies are currently in effect which
drive the contracting manager to an easier short term
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solution to the problem. Mr. Pyatt has stated that only
FFP contracts will be made by the Navy unless there is
sufficient documented evidence that another type of
contract will result in less cost to the government. He
has developed a preferential policy of accepting 50 percent
cost share ratios for incentive contracts in the cases
where an incentive contract is substantiated and approved
as the best method for reducing total costs to the
government. [Ref. 341
These types of detailed contracting policies allow the
contractor to gain a long term cost advantage. The
contractor can predict, with relative certainty, the
results of contract negotiations over the long run based on
contract type and cost share (if applicable). He already
knows the budget available, the planned production scheme,
and his estimate of actual costs to produce the product.
The contractor's risk is reduced to his economic business
considerations. His corporate financial structure,
internal rate of return, estimates of future costs based on
technological advances, etc., are the considerations which
will determine the contractors' s long term cost and
profit. Mr. Pyatt has effectively made the contractor's
job of predicting the future risk and return easier by
specifying the contract type and cost share ratios.
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B. THE CONTRACT SCENARIO
The LCC model characteristics and factors are useful
for predicting future cost behavior and the long term
effects of decision trade-offs because they are general,
quantifiable, and easily applied. Contracting managers,
however, are faced with a multitude of regulations,
policies, court cases, and experience which guide them
through the myriad of trade-off decisions necessary to
accomplish an effective acquisition strategy. The LCC
model can be used by the contract manager to organize the
decision trade-offs which must be made and to document the
use of other than firm fixed price contracts. The goal
should be to execute a long term production acquisition
strategy that results in a minimum total cost to the
government
.
To simulate a contracting scenario, using the total
cost factor derived by relationship (8) above, the
government acquisition manager can take the estimate of the
contractor's proposed cost and apply appropriate estimates
of target fee and incentive fee to arrive at an appropriate
multiplier of the proposed cost (Total Cost Factor). This
multiplier can be used to estimate the contractor's
assignment of actual cost to the contract proposal;
Cost estimates are derived based on the type of
contract to be written and historical trend data that
support factor assumptions. An approximation of the
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actual cost (relationship 6) can be developed by the
government contract manager which represents a fair
assessment of the costs which the contractor may actually
incur
.
C. DEVELOPING A NEGOTIATING POSITION
If the government contract manager is relatively
comfortable with the accounting of historical costs, he can
achieve a realistic target cost by "going in" to a contract
negotiation with C*t based on last year's actual cost.
The contractor's actual cost figure is derived from
assumptions made about the contractor's expectations of
cost share, profit, and a detailed knowledge of the
business to determine an estimate of the contractor's
internal rate of return. The accuracy of the cost estimate
is based on the accuracy of the business predictions made
and the predictability of the contractor's application of
the cost share and profit ratios.
The LCC model carries the results of prior year cost
assumptions forward to predict future year cost behavior.
It is important to recognize that the LCC model will
portray key factors as inaccurate forecasts of future cost
behavior if inappropriate estimates are made initially.
Cost estimates made this year to contract for the product
this year will affect the cost of the contract in future
years because historical costs are used to estimate future
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period costs. Cost estimates will dramatically affect the
total cost to the government over time.
A FPIF contract "going in" cost would be negotiated
along with a "going in" profit (C*t times the profit
ratio). The cost incentive fee would be agreed to in the
negotiation as the cost share times the difference between
proposed cost and actual cost (relationship 7). The result
of the negotiation would be a target cost, target fee, and
cost incentive relationship that represents the total cost
exposure to the government for that contract. [Ref. 351
In a Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) arrangement, a
target cost and target fee are negotiated. The target fee
is bounded by a negotiated maximum and minimum fee.
Relationship (10) above describes the maximum fee which is
assumed in this application of the LCC model. By using the
LCC model as a negotiating tool, the contract manager can
derive the CPIF "going in" negotiating cost as C*t
(relationship 11) and add a going in target fee of C*t
times the profit ratio. The profit the government would
accept in negotiations would be bounded by the amount
derived by multiplying the contractor's proposed cost times
the profit ratio (relationship 6).
Contracting procedures state that the cost share should
be multiplied by the difference between the actual cost and
the target cost. Since the CPIF target cost is unknown to
the acquisition manager until after the negotiations are
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complete, the C*t is used in this application of the LCC
model to represent the target cost. Because C*t is the
estimated lowest cost that the contractor can incur, C*t
can be used by the acquisition manager to identify the
government's maximum expected fee liability in the cost
share relationship. The maximum profit and the maximum fee
are then added together to get the maximum expected cost
incentive fee for a CPIF contract [Ref. 361.
The profit and cost incentive fee would then be added
to the proposed cost and limited by 120 percent of the
proposed costs (relationship 5).
D. LONG TERM ESTIMATES
Variables other than historical cost, cost share, and
profit ratio are key to the actual cost versus proposed
cost relationship. Factors relating to performance
requirements, corporate financial structure, economic
considerations, capacity utilization, and production
quality must all be considered by the acquisition manager
in his acquisition strategy decisions. These factors are
not included in the LCC model because it is difficult to
generalize and quantify their relationships.
Professors Willis R. Greer and Shu S. Liao found in a
study of the effects of competition on the total cost of
major weapon systems to the government that:
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The profitability of major defense contractors should be
examined to decipher its relationship to general business
conditions. Given the flexibility contractors have in
accumulating costs for a product, it is naive to assume
that the price paid by the government is the sum of "true
cost" and a predetermined profit. Only by examining the
profitability of contractors under different sets of
business conditions can one understand their [pricing]
strategies. [Ref. 371
The "other" profitability variables are important to
the actual cost versus proposed cost relationship.
However, there is no single Navy major weapon system data
base which exists to document economic considerations or
corporate financial structure data. [Ref. 381
Through interviews with Navy contract managers, this
researcher discovered that data bases available which
describe all of the normal qualitative decision factors for
a major weapon system over the acquisition cycle is spread
throughout the acquisition structure including the program
manager, budget manager, contract manager, and acquisition
approval authority. No one person or office currently has
the responsibility for reviewing all of the decision
factors necessary to make decision trade-offs in a long
term acquisition strategy.
Even though not all of the decision variables are
quantifiable or included in the LCC model, by reviewing the
quantitative variables that are included in the LCC model,
the contracting officer will be better prepared to document
the least cost trade-off alternatives in a long term
acquisition strategy.
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E. SUPPORT FOR THE LCC MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR) was
chartered to study contract pricing, financing, and
profit (markup) policies to determine if they are
resulting in effective and efficient spending of public
funds and maintaining the viability of the defense
industrial base .... [Ref. 39]
Since the DFAIR study is very recent, some of the findings
of the study are included here to support LCC model
assumpt i ons
.
The LCC model assumes that there is little or no
competition for production contracts and that the
production contract relationship exists for several years.
Exhibit I of the DFAIR study provided data to support these
assumpt i ons.
According to the DFAIR report, a major weapon system
acquisition production process usually involves writing an
FPIF/FFP contract. The contract relationship was reported
to last an average of between three and fifteen years. The
relative cost of major weapon system production contracts
is reported to be large, and the technical and cost
uncertainty associated with production contracts is
relatively small. The average number of producers for a
weapon system product is one, but competition is sometimes
obtained for major weapon system production contracts.
[Ref. 401
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Another assumption made in the LCC model analysis is
that the contractor's internal rate of return is twenty
percent. The DFAIR study found that the primary goal for
most companies is to achieve a stable and adequate return
on equity. Most of the corporations indicated that an
acceptable rate of return was between fifteen and twenty
percent after taxes [Ref. 411.
To use the LCC model one can input cost predictions
based on government estimates of actual costs based on the
proposed cost, historical costs actually incurred, or on
detailed cost estimates which are based on extensive cost
analysis. The DFAIR study reports that cost estimators
project past experience into the future to develop cost
estimates and expected profits [Ref. 421.
The LCC model includes a budget factor to consider the
effects of budget changes on the actual costs and proposed
costs submitted by the contractor. The DFAIR report points
out that contractors have, and use, the knowledge that
their projects are expected to continue in the Five Year
Defense Plan (Budget Planning Document) to be able to
better project expected returns on equity in the long run
[Ref. 431.
The LCC model assumes that there is a relationship
between the actual and proposed cost, and that the cost
actually incurred on any production contract does not equal
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the cost proposed by the contractor. The DFAIR report
supports this assumption.
Once a program is approved and the competition is over,
the best way to improve the returns [for a contractor] is
to become somewhat pessimistic on the projected costs
during contract negotiations and then, once the contract
is negotiated, perform better than those pessimistic
projections. [Ref. 44]
F. THE "REAL WORLD" CONTRACTING SCENARIOS
Appendix A documents the results of numerous telephone
interviews. Realistic contract parameters and assumptions
were solicited from Procuring Contracting Officers,
Business Financial Managers, and other acquisition
professionals. Based on the factors and assumptions
provided in Appendix A and the characteristics and
relationships of the LCC model described above in Chapter
III, factor assignments were made in the LCC model to
develop a data base for an acquisition strategy sensitivity
analysis (Appendix B).
The sensitivity analysis was designed, first, to
portray a "real world" contracting scenario and, second, to
identify the effect of contract strategy changes on the Net
Incentive Factor (NIF) described in Chapter III. Table 2
shows the real world production contract scenarios which
were used in the sensitivity analysis. Three production
quantity schemes were developed as appropriate for use in
the analysis based on their common use and differing
effects on total cost to the government.
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TABLE 2






K types Cost Shares Rat i os
FFP 100% 10%- 15%
Normal Production
10, 15,20,30,25, 15, 10
FPIF 50%, 35%, 20% 9%-15%
Ramp Up Production
5,10,25,25,25,25, 10
CPIF 50%, 35%, 20% 6%-9%
Price Ceiling - 120% to 150% of target cost.
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Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is commonly used to
encourage stability in the production phase by identifying
the production problems early and adjusting production
methodology before large quantities are produced. The
normal production scheme takes the shape of a bell shaped
or "normal" curve and is described as a Mhumped M production
schedule in the LCC model description [Ref. 451. The "ramp
up" production scheme is a suggested alternative because it
starts with a low production quantity and raises to a level
that might be considered as the economic production level
for the contractor. Information provided by the ramp up
production scheme can be useful to a contract manager who
is trying to employ efficient capacity utilization in his
long term acquisition strategy.
The budget factor is difficult to predict or change,
but is significant to the estimate of proposed costs.
NAVAIR has experienced a budget factor of 90 percent to 97
percent from 1983 to 1985 (assume here 95 percent)
[Ref. 461. The learning factor for the aerospace industry
is determined to be 80 percent as documented in current
literature. Factors which may cause variation are maturity
of the system and complexity of the technology. The
learning parameter could vary for an individual contractor




The remainder of Table 2 documents the input parameters
of profit ratio, cost share, price ceiling, and maximum fee
which were provided by the responses of the telephone
interviews. Based on these input parameters, the LCC model
shows the effects of short term factor changes on the Net
Incentive Factor and the long term total estimated cost to
the government.
To help explain the use of Table 2, assume that an, FFP
contract will be analyzed under a LRIP production schedule.
Quantities to be contracted for over years (t) 1 through 7
are 5, 5, 10, 20, 30, 30, 25. The profit ratio ranges from
10 percent to 15 percent according to interviews with
contracting officers in the field. "What if" the
contractor is given 10 percent profit to complete this
LRIP/ f o 1 1 ow-on production successfully within the
contracted cost parameters? The contractor's cost share
for a FFP contract is defined to be 100 percent, the
learning factor is assumed to be 80 percent, and the budget
factor for this scenario is assumed to be 95 percent.
Table 3 documents the data results of this scenario as
it is presented in Appendix B. Recall that the Appendix B
factors and relationships are described in Table 1 (located
in Chapter III).
Note that the NIF column in Table 3 is affected by the
relationships between the percentage change in quantity,
cost share, profit percent, learning and budget factors.
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TABLE 3
FFP LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION — 107. PROFIT
Year Qt 7.ch anqeQt cost share iDrofit7. 1 earn in
q
budqet
1 5 ERR 100 . 007. 10. 007. 80 . 007. 95 . 007.
£ 5 1 00
.
. 007. 1 00 . 007. 10. 007. 80 . 007. 95 . 007.
3 10 £00 .007. 100 . 007. 10. 007. 80 . 007. 95 . 007.
4 £0 £00 . 007. 1 00 . 007. 10. 007. 80 . 007. 95 . 007.
5 30 150, . 00% 1 00 . 007. 10. 007. 80 . 007. 95 . 007.
6 30 100..007. 100 . 007. 10. 007. 80 . 007. 95 . 007.
7 £5 y>-j 307. 100. . 007. 10. 007. 80 . 007. 95 . 007.
Year NIF c*t Cat Cpt TCfact or
i — 30 . 337. $50 . 00 $55 . 00 $55 . 00 100.007.
£ 39 . 33V. $44 . 00 $41 .80 $41 .80 100.007.
3 TO 77V $66.88 $63 .54 $63.54 i 00. 007.
4 4 . 507. $101.66 $96 .57 $96.57 i 00. 007.
5 - uiU • UvJ /. $115.89 $110 . 10 $110.10 100.007.
6 - 41.947. $88 . 08 $83 .67 $83.67 i 00. 007.
7 -100.007. $55.78 $5£ .99 $5£.99 1 00 . 007.
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Results of these changing relationships also affect the
TCfactor, and accordingly, the relative amounts of proposed
cost (Cpt), actual cost (Cat), and the government's minimum
going in cost (C*t). In this scenario proposed cost equals
actual cost because of this fact: if a FFP contract
requires the contractor to accept 100 percent of the risk
of actual costs incurred over the proposed costs, the
contractor is motivated to keep actual cost levels equal to
or below proposed costs.
The data in Appendix B document the scenarios and
provide figures representing the resultant incentive for
cost incurrence (NIF data entry) for each contract
scenario. The total estimated cost to the government for
each "what if" contract scenario is derived and compared to
price ceilings and cost plus maximum fee to ensure price
real i sm.
G. COMPETITIVE PRODUCTION STRATEGY
To pursue a competitive production strategy over the
long run, an acquisition manager must split the award of a
production contract into at least two parts depending on
the number of producers available, and the percent of
business which will be given to each contractor. Assuming
that there are only two producers, that the contracts
awarded will be FFP contracts, and that the contractor who
"wins" the competition will get at least a majority of the
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business, an acquisition manager can modify the LCC model
to analyze the cost minimizing incentives of a competitive
procurement contract strategy. By multiplying the quantity
each year by the percent of the production quantity each
contractor expects to win in the award, the NIF for each
contractor can be analyzed. Table 4 presents the
hypothesized modification of data for a dual source
competitive procurement.
Notice that the only difference between the "winner
takes all", and the "winner takes 60 percent production",
is the change in production quantity. This type of dual
source incentive contracting does nothing to change the
NIF. The production schedule must still be altered to
change the NIF.
Effective use of the results of this competitive
procurement modification to the LCC model might provide
acquisition managers with some insight into the ways the
production scheme may be manipulated to arrive at a least
cost incentive for dual source producers.
The next chapter provides an analysis of the
sensitivity results contained in Appendix B. Suggestions




MODIFICATION FOR DUAL SOURCE
FFP No--•rnal Production: Winner takes all
Year Qt 7.chanqeQt cost share prof i t°/. NIF
1 10 ERR 100.007. 1 . 007. 4 . 507.
£ 15 150.007. 100.007. 1 . 007. -7.117.
3 £0 133.337. 100.007. 1 . 007. 4 . 507.
4 30 150.007. 100.007. 1 . 007. -41.947.
5 £5 83 . 337. 100.007. 1 . 007. -58. £07.
6 15 60 . 007. 100.007. 1 . 007. -53.567.
7 10 66 . 707. 1 00 . 007. 1 . 007. -100.07.
FFP Normal Production: Winner takes 607. Production

















1 33 . 33V.




1 00 . 007. 3L . 007. 4 . 507.
100.007. 1L . 007. -7.11 7.
1 00 . 007. 3L . 007. 4 . 507.
100.007. 3L . 007. -41.947.
100.007. 3L . 007. -58 . £07.
100.007. 3L 0.007. —53 . 56X
1 00 . 007. 3L . 007. -100.07.
V. ANALYSIS QF THE RESULTS
To investigate the utilization of the LCC model,
various scenarios were developed to represent a set of
contract situations that realistically depict a major
weapon system production contracting scenario.
A. THE TRADE-OFFS
Appendix B data were generated by first presenting the
LCC model factors in a spreadsheet format. Values for LCC
model factors were changed within the parameters of
Table 2. Results were analyzed for sensitivity to change,
result of the change on the NIF, and resultant change in
the total cost to the government. By testing the
sensitivity to change of the model parameters, insight is
gained into the ways a contracting officer can change the
key variables of a contracting strategy decision to effect
a more advantageous government contracting strategy and
negotiating position.
B. FACTORS MOST SENSITIVE TO CHANGE
As the LCC model factors were changed to depict the
Table 2 contract scenarios, the factors representing the
greatest sensitivity to change were identified to be the
contract type and the quantities produced in the production
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scheme. These two factors, in combination, determined
whether a negative NIF could be obtained and to what degree
profit ratios and/or cost shares could be changed to create
a negative NIF.
C. FINDINGS OF THE ANALYSIS
The sequence of FFP contracts ranged from a LRIP, 10
percent profit ratio (FFPL10), to a ramp up production
scheme offering a 15 percent profit (FFPR15). See Appendix
B for scenario data. These FFP contracting scenarios were
studied first since they are publicized to be the most
effective "cost minimizing** contract types.
Of these FFP contracting scenarios, only the ramp up
production scheme created a NIF that might be considered
sufficient long run incentive for the contractor to reduce
cost- to a minimum level. Table 5 shows that, considering
the NIF in the second and subsequent years of the FFP ramp
up production scenario, zero or negative NIF's were
generated in the years three through seven. The high
positive NIF generated in the second year of the ramp up
production scheme would be overcome by follow-on
contracts. It would appear that use of this production
scheme and contract type would create a strong incentive

































































































This result also supports the conclusion that a profit
maximizing contractor would be willing to bid for this
production contract in the first or second year because the
cost incentive strongly favors maximum actual cost
incurrence in those years. The contractor can tolerate
extensive cost growth in the first and second years.
The first year actual costs overstate the cost levels
at which the contractor could have produced the product.
These inflated actual costs become the historical costs
which will be applied by the contracting officer to
estimate the following year's actual costs. The second
year actual costs will be even higher given the
considerable lack of incentive to control them. Thus, even
though the scenario creates a cost minimizing incentive for
the contractor in years three through seven, the actual
costs incurred in years one and two will have already
inflated the historical actual cost figures used to
estimate the total costs for years three through seven.
From this analysis one can deduce that the goal of the
contract manager must be to create a contracting scenario
by manipulating the contract type and production scheme to
provide a zero or negative NIF for the early years of the
production cycle. Thus, the long term results of a cost
minimizing NIF will be the lowest possible costs filtering
through the follow-on production contracts. Minimum
historical cost data will be used to estimate future period
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actual costs. The end result will be a lower total cost to
the government for the entire production cycle.
This researcher found that the FFP ramp up production
scheme could not be altered within the Table 2 parameters
to produce a negative NIF in the second year of the
production cycle. It was also found that no combination of
profit ratio, learning factor, or budget factor results in
a negative NIF in the first two years of this contract
scenario. The contract incentive allows the contractor to
charge the maximum proposed cost in the first and second
years. There is no incentive for the contractor to control
convenience cost incurrence until the third and subsequent
years
.
None of the other iterations of the FFP contract type
resulted in a negative NIF over the long term production
contract cycle. This result demonstrates that the blind
use of FFP contracts can lead to unnecessary convenience
cost incurrence and higher total production costs to the
government in the long run. The contract manager must
consider the implied cost incentives of long run contract
strategy decisions. He must attempt to reduce the
incentives to incur convenience costs on government
contracts and so reduce the total government cost of
acquiring major weapon systems.
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The production schemes were manipulated within the FFP
and FPIF contract types to produce a negative or zero NIF
in the first two years. Table 6 shows the results of "what
if" production scheme trade-offs.
As shown in Table 6, a FFP contract must be produced in
similar quantities each year to be able to produce a cost
minimizing incentive for the contractor. This finding
supports the hypothesis that maintaining production
quantity stability will minimize the incentive for
convenience cost incurrence.
Further support for a stable production scheme is shown
in Table 6. Use of the LCC model shows that, in an
incentive type of contracting scenario, acquisition
strategists and managers can vary the cost and profit
factors. Immediate feedback is obtained about what kinds
of changes result in a negative NIF. The quantity in each
of the years can be manipulated to produce the total
production quantities in the appropriate combination of
quantities per year over the length of the production
cycle. Table 6 shows the results of changing cost share
and quantity changes. Only the smallest percent of change
in the production quantities results in negative NIF for
cost sharing incentive contracts, thus, further supporting
the need for stability in the production quantity schemes













































50'/. Cost share: Minimum cost incentive production scheme
Year at 7.ch anqeOt cost share prof i t7. NIF
1 10 ERR 50 . 007. 14.007. -1.367.
2 12 120.007. 50 . 007. 14.007. -2.717.
3 14 116.707. 50 . 007. 14.007. -0 . 787.
4 17 121.407. 50 . 007. 14.007.
5 20 117. 607. 50 . 007. 14.007. -1.367.
6 24 120.007. 50 . 007. 14.007. -2.717.
7 28 116.707. 50 . 007. 14.007. -50 . 00"/.
307. Cost shai-e: Minimum cost incent ive product ion scheme
Year at 7.ch an qeOt cost share prof i t'/. NIF
1 15 ERR 30 . 007. 14.007. -0 . 237.
£ 16 106.707. 30 . 007. 14.007. -0 . 397.
3 17 106.307. 30 . 007. 14.007. -0 . 497.
4 18 105.907. 30 . 007. 14.007. -0 . 597.
5 19 105.607. 30 . 007. 14.007. -0 . 677.
6 20 105.307. 30 . 007. 14.007. I— • 1 —' '
.





2.07. Cost share: Minimum cost incentive production scheme
Year at '/.ch anqeQt cost share prof i t7. NIF
1 £1 ERR £0 . 007. 14.007. 0.517.
2 £0 95 . £07. £0 . 007. 14.007. . 467.
3 19 95 . 007. £0 . 007. 14.007. . 407.
4 18 94 . 707. £0 . 007. 14.007. . 34 '/.
5 17 94 . 407. £0 . 007. 1 4 . 007. . £77.
6 16 94.107. £0 . 007. 14.007. -1.167.
7 14 87 . 507. £0 . 007. 14.007. -£0 . 007.
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Manipulation of cost shares and profit ratios,
individually or simultaneously, will provide more
information to the acquisition manager about the trade-off
decisions that must be made.
If the production scheme has been developed to produce
a cost minimizing NIF in the first two years, by the end of
the second year of the production cycle, historical costs
are established which represent actual cost incurrence at a
cost minimizing level. These historical costs can then be
applied to follow-on contract cost estimates. The cost
estimates will result in a minimum total cost to the
government
.
Even if the third year NIF is extremely high, the
presumption here is that acceptable cost proposals will
reflect the prior two year's historical cost data and the
total price paid on the contract will not include payment
for unnecessarily incurred convenience costs from the first
two years.
D. SCENARIOS WHICH REDUCE LONG RUN COST
Appendix B data were reviewed for possible combinations
of contract type, production scheme, profit ratio, and cost
share that would provide negative NIFs for cost incurrence
for the first and second years of the production cycle.
Effective use of these contracting scenarios would reduce
the actual cost incurrence to acceptable minimum levels
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early in the production cycle, and thereby reduce the
historically based cost estimates for follow on production
contracts. None of the Table 2 contract parameter
combinations resulted in a negative or zero NIF in the
first two years. However, Table 7 shows that by reducing
the profit ratio to one percent, the CPIF normal production
scheme scenario resulted in seven years of negative NIF's
for a cost share between 35 percent and 50 percent
(CN13,CN15)
.
The results of this analysis demonstrates the effects
of writing one contract at a time, without considering the
effects of the incentives on the long run total cost to the
government. The assumption made in major weapon systems
acquisition today is that if the contract type is firm
fixed price, or the cost share incentive arrangement is 50
percent, then an incentive exists for the contractor to
incur minimum cost on the contract. This assumption does
not appear to be supported by this research.
This researcher assumed that Table 2 accurately
portrays the most commonly used contracts written today.
After analyzing the "what if" contracting scenarios, one
can deduce that there is no combination of contract type or
production schemes commonly in use today that provides a
cost minimizing incentive to the contractor. If the
assumed production quantity schemes do not change, the only




NEGATIVE NET INCENTIVE FACTORS
CN13
Year Qt costshare prof i t'/. NIF
1 10 35 . 00'/. 1.507. -0 . 327.
£ 15 35 . 007. 1 . 507. -4. 187.
3 £0 35 . 007. 1 . 507. -0 . 327.
4 30 35 . 007. 1 . 507. -15.747.
5 £5 35 . 007. 1 . 507. -£1. 137.
6 15 35 . 007. 1 . 507. -ig.597.
7 10 35 . 007. 1 . 507. -35 . 007.
Year- Qt costshare Pi- Of i t'/. NIF
1 10 50 . 007. 1 . 507. -1.077.
£ 15 50 . 007. 1 . 507. -6.517.
3 £0 50 . 007. 1 . 507. -1.077.
4 30 50 . 007. 1 . 507. -22.327.
5 CJ 50 . 007. 1 . 507. -30 . 437.
6 15 50 . 007. 1 . 507. do • do/.
7 10 50 . 007. 1 . 507. -50 . 007.
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incentive to control costs provided for a one and one-half
percent profit ratio (Table 7).
. . . if the buyer (government) wants to assure the
continued existence of several producers for the sake of
future competition, the buyer must behave in a manner
which will provide adequate returns to the producers.
[Ref. 47]
Few contractors will deai with the government for a one
percent profit ratio. Commercial contracting provides much
more attractive returns for much less risk than a one and
one half percent cost type contract affords. The result of
this type of contract strategy decision would be to reduce
the number of producers, thus negating any savings
attributable to the negative net incentive factors.
The assumption that incentives are being imposed to
minimize costs is not supported by the results projected
using the LCC model. To the contrary, the analysis, using
the LCC model, to foresee the effects of acquisition
strategy decisions, supports the conclusion that production
cycle strategies commonly in use today do not provide
incentives to reduce costs to a minimum level over the long
term production cycle.
In today's regulated, structured, and controlled
acquisition environment contract managers do not have the
flexibility to consider the effects of the execution of
each year's production contract on the assumptions which
are used to build the follow-on contract parameters.
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The following chapter will summarize the results of the
contracting scenario analysis and draw some conclusions as
to how the acquisition managers might use the LCC model to
reduce the total cost of government major weapon systems
production contracting.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PRINCIPLE CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study was to analyze the Life
Cycle Contracting (LCC) model developed by Dan C. Boger,
Carl R. Jones, and Kevin C. Sontheimer to assess the
utility of the model in major weapon systems acquisitions.
The principle conclusions were derived based on the results
of the sensitivity analysis and from the responses provided
during telephone interviews.
1. The LCC model parameters and relationships are
supportable, given the current literature available
in major weapon system acquisition. It is well
understood by industry and the government that the
price paid for a contract is not necessarily what the
contract could have cost if there was full and open
competition, effective convenience cost control
programs, and/or no prior knowledge of expected
funding levels for major weapon system programs.
2. Current regulations, laws, and acquisition policy
limit the parameters within which acquisition
strategy can be formulated. Most of the current
major weapon system contracting is being accomplished
with Firm Fixed Price Contracts whenever possible.
If an incentive contract must be used, current policy
favors fifty/fifty cost shares on incentive
arrangements. By specifying contract type and cost
share ratios, acquisition policy makers have made it
easier for contractors to predict what levels of
convenience costs will be accepted before the cost
integrity of the contract is jeopardized.
3. The LCC model does not develop a specific "going in M
negotiating target cost or target profit. The LCC
model can be used to interpret results of trade-off
decisions and assist the contract manager in
developing sound negotiating strategy alternatives.
Total cost to the government can not be specifically
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predicted with this model especially in the
negotiated CPIF contracting scenario. Because of the
simplicity of the model factors and relationships,
the magnitude of a total cost changes can only be
inferred by interpreting the effects of the changed
NIF on the total cost.
4. The acquisition strategy decision for the production
of a major weapon system must include an in-depth
evaluation of performance requirements, corporate
financial structure, the current and future economy,
capacity utilization, the industrial base, and
production quality. None of these considerations are
dealt with explicitly in the LCC model. It would be
difficult to modify this "easy to use" model to
include more specific quantified parameters.
Inclusion of more parameters would not necessarily
provide better information for the acquisition
manager to build negotiating and strategic contract
plans
.
5. The LCC model can be used to simulate "real world"
contracting scenarios and review "what if" changes to
those contracting scenarios. The LCC model can be
useful to a contract manager who is trying to employ
efficient capacity utilization in his long term
acquisition strategy. The LCC model can also be used
to determine what effect competitive second sourcing
will have on the long term total cost to the
government
.
6. The two factors determined to be most sensitive to
change in the LCC model were the contract type and
the quantities produced in the production scheme.
These two factors in combination determined whether a
negative NIF could be attained (a positive incentive
was created to control convenience cost incurrence).
7. A profit maximizing firm would be willing to bid on
the first two years of a production FFP contract with
a ramped up production scheme. The cost incentive in
this case strongly favors convenience cost incurrence
in the first two years of an expected seven year
production run.
8. To minimize total cost to the government, the
acquisition strategist must attempt to develop a
production scheme and contract type combination that
reduces the incentive to incur convenience costs in
the first two years of the production cycle to
minimize total cost to the government. Historical
costs are used to estimate acceptable follow on
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contract proposals. If incentives are built to
encourage convenience cost incurrence in the early
years of a production cycle, these high costs will
get carried forward as future period basic cost
estimates. The cost will be inflated by convenience
costs before inflation is even considered.
9. None of the FFP contracting scenarios analyzed
resulted in negative NIF's for the long term
production cycle. An FFP contract is not necessarily
the proper contract to use to insure lowest total
cost contracts for the government.
10. Production quantity stability was the only realistic
contracting technique found to provide a negative NIF
in the long run production contracting scenarios.
Only the smallest possible percentage of change in
production quantities between years resulted in
negative NIF's for the long run production cycle.
11. There is no combination of contract type or
production scheme commonly in use today that provides




The LCC model should be used by acquisition strategy
decision makers in the early stages of major weapon system
program development. Early interest in the effects of
production quantity schemes and contract types will
determine whether the program can be produced at least
total cost to the government over the long run production
eye 1 e
.
The LCC model should be used by acquisition managers
who must justify a deviation from full and open competition
in compliance with CICA. Use of the LCC model will allow
the acquisition manager to demonstrate the results of the
viable, lower cost alternatives to a FFP contract.
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Documentation of the alternative contracting scenarios is
easily presented and understood using LCC model formulated
graphs and tables.
The LCC model should be used to support stabilized
production quantity proposals, and could be effectively
used to support expected production cost savings in
Multiyear procurement proposals.
The LCC model proves to be a very useful decision
making tool for the acquisition manager. LCC model
factors can be manipulated to create many combinations of
contracting strategy trade-off scenarios. Effects on the
total cost to the government are easily monitored through
the net incentive factor (NIF). The NIF indicates the
level of incentive present in the contracting scenario to
incur convenience costs; those costs incurred over and
above the lowest possible total cost to the government.
The model can easily be modified to focus on the
effects of dual source follow-on production contracts and
is, therefore, useful in today's major weapon system
production world of "less than full and open compet i t i on"
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research should be conducted to answer the
following questions:
1. Can other factors affecting contractor
"pro f i tab i 1 i tyH be described and measured by the
government? If so, how can they be included as
factors in the LCC model?
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2. Can a data base be developed or accumulated that
includes all of the data required to test the LCC
model with actual major weapon system production
contract data?
3. Can the results of the LCC model analysis be used to
successfully convince Congress to stabilize
production quantities in long run production
scenar i os?
4. Does acquisition for major weapon systems in the
shipbuilding industry fit the LCC model
characteristics, relationships, and assumptions?
5. What is the relationship between the award fee (in a
CPAF contract) and other LCC model cost factors? Can
the award fee be sufficiently defined and predicted
to be able to use the LCC model to analyze its
effects on strategic contracting decisions?
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APPENDIX A
TELEPHONE INTERVIEW AND RESPONSES
Quest ions:
1. What types of production contracts do you write, or
have you written in the recent past?
2. What profit ratios are normally assigned to each type
of contract you write?
3. What cost share is normally assigned to each of the
types of incentive contracts you write?
4. Would you use a cost model to develop contract
strategy decisions, especially in the area of
follow-on production competition? Comments?
Responses: Responses were solicited from U. S. Navy
Contracting Officers, Business Financial Managers, and
other contracting professionals currently working on
aerospace weapon system procurement programs. The
responses are synopsized here to preserve the anonymity of
the respondees.
1. Types of contracts used recently ranged from Firm
Fixed Price to Cost plus Award Fee, with all but one
saying that only Fixed Price contracts were being
awarded for follow-on production programs.
2. The profit ratios ranged from five to nine and a half
percent for a cost type contract, to twelve to
fifteen percent for a fixed price contract. The most
often used profit percent was fourteen to fifteen
percent for a fixed price contract.
3. I f an incentive arrangement is used, the cost shares
used were 80/20, 70/30, 65/35, and 50/50 for a fixed
price contract and 65/35, 50/50 for a cost type
contract. The majority who hesitated to use an
incentive type of contract, in lieu of a firm fixed
price, said that they would use a 50/50 share line if
they wrote an incentive contract.
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4. Would a cost model be used? Comments?
-No.
-Depending of the type of contract and the pressures
from above to write the contract in a specific way,
I might be able to use a model to justify using other
than a firm fixed price contract.
-A cost model couldn't hurt. Right now I don't have
many options though. The quantities are already set,
all I have to do is fill in the amount of money
ava i 1 ab 1 e
.
-A cost model would not be useful. We are being
required to second source our production contracts
now. We are also being required to write fixed price
contracts. We have no say in the production
quant i t i es
.
-A cost model might be a useful tool if it considered
competition. Right now we are going out with
Technical Data Packages and soliciting competition
for production. There are sources available who want
the work. I could use a model that would help me
decide how to best contract for that production work
in a competitive multi -source arena.
-A model wouldn't be useful to me since my contract
decisions are mandated by the Secretary of the Navy.
I must use firm fixed price contracts whenever
possible. The exception turns into a fixed price
incentive arrangement, if you can get it approved. I
don't have much room for choice. Normally they hand
me the budget and say, "here's the money, now how
much can you get for it?". Tailoring the
requirements and specifications takes up most of my
time. It is currently referred to as a "lust
control" program, where we scrub the specifications
of all bells and whistles.
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APPENDIX B
LEGEND OF SPREADSHEET FORMULAS
Qt Production Quantity this period(t)
%changeQt Qt (this period)/Qt-l (last period)
costshare % of over/under target cost the
contractor is responsible for
profit% % of profit assigned to the contract
learning % learning (experience factor, learning
curve) applied to the contract
budget % of program budget normally funded by
congress
NIF [((cost share + profit%) * budget *
learning) / (1 + discount rate of 20%)]
* [Qt+1)/Qt] - cost share
C*t First year = $10 * Qt; second and
subsequent years = learning * Cat-1 *
%changeQt
Cat TCFactor * Cpt
Cpt First year assumed to be 1.1 * C*t
Second and subsequent years = budget *
learning * (Cat-1) * %changeQt
TCFactor Assuming Price Ceiling and Max Cost are
120% * Cpt;
TCFactor = [(1.2 - %profit - costshare) *
Cpt] / (1 - costshare)
Profit profit* * Cpt
INCFEE FPIF = costshare * (Cpt-Cat)
CPIF = costshare * (Cat-C*t)
MaxFee CPIF 20% * Cpt
74
Total Cost FFP = Cpt + *profit
FPIF = (Cpt + *profit INCFEE) limited by Ceiling of
120% * Cpt
CPIF unknown until results of negotiations are known
APPENDIX B
LEGEND OF SCENARIO ABBREVIATIONS
CONTRACT TYPE PRODUCTION SCHEME PROFIT % COST SHARE
FFP Low Rate Initial 6% 20%
Production 9%
J_0%
FPIF Normal Production J_2% 357.
j_5%
CPIF Ramp Up Production 507.
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FFP CONTRACTS: LRIP, NORMAL, AND RAMP UP PRODUCTION
FFPL10
Year Qt ?changeQt costshare profit? learning budget
1 5 ERR 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
2 5 100.0? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
3 10 200.0% 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
4 20 200.0? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
5 30 150.0? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
6 30 100.0? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
7 25 83.3? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
FFPL14
ar Qt ?changeQt costshare p rofit? 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 100.00? 14.00? 80.00? 95.00?
2 5 100.0? 100.00"? 14.00? 80.00? 95.00?
3 10 200.0? 100.00? 14.00? 80.00? 95.00?
4 20 200.0? 100.00? 14.00? 80.00? 95.00?
5 30 150.0? 100.00? 14.00? 80.00? 95.00?
6 30 100.0? 100.00? 14.00? 80.00? 95.00?
7 25 83.3? 100.00? 14.00? 80.00? 95.00?
FFPL15
ar Qt ?changeQt costshare p rofit? 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 100.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
2 5 100.0? 100.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
3 10 200.0? 100.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
4 20 200.0? 100.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
5 30 150.0? 100.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
6 30 100.0? 100.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
7 25 83.3? 100.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
FFPN10
ar Qt ?changeQt costshare- p rofit? 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
2 15 150.0? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
3 20 133.3? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
4 30 150.0? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
5 25 83.3? 100.00? - 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
6 15 60.0? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
7 10 66.7? 100.00? 10.00? 80.00? 95.00?
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FFP CONTRACTS: LRIP, NORMAL, AND RAMP UP PRODUCTION
FFPL10
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor ^profit
1 -30.332 $50.00 $55.00 $55.00 100.002 $5.50
2 3 9.33 2 $44.00 $41 .80 $41 .80 100.002 $ a . 1 8
3 39.332 $66.88 $63.54 $63.54 100.002 $6.35
4 4.502 $101 .66 $96.57 $96.57 100.002 $9.66
5 -30.332 $115.89 $110.10 $110.10 1 CO. 002 $11.01
6 -41 .942 $88.08 $83.67 $83.67 100.002 $8.37






















































































































































































































































FFP CONTRACTS: LRIP, NORMAL, AND RAMP UP PRODUCTION
FFPN14
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profits learning budget
1 10 ERR 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 15 150.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 20 133.3% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 30 150.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 83.3% 1C0.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 15 60.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 66.7% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
FFPN15
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learnini budget
1 10 ERR 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 15 150.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 20 133.3% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 30 150.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 83.3% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 15 60.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 66.7% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
FFPR10
ar Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 100.00% 10.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 100.00% 10.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 100.00% 10.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 100.00% 10.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 100.00% 10.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 100.00% 10.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 100.00% 10.00% 80.00% 95.00%
FFPR14
ar Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 100.00% 14.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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FFP CONTRACTS: LRIP, NORMAL, AND RAMP UP PRODUCTION
FFPN14
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor *profit
1 8.30% $100.00 $110.00 $110.00 100.00% $15.40
2 -3.73% $132.00 $125.40 $125.40 100.00% $17.56
3 8.30% $133.76 $127.07 $127.07 100.00% $17.79
4 -39.83% $152.49 $144.86 $144.86 100.00% $20.28
5 -56.68% $96.57 $91 .75 $91 .75 100.00% $12.34
6 -51 .87% $44.04 $41 .84 $41 .84 100.00% $5.86
7 -100.00% $22.31 $21 .20 $21 .20 100.00% $2.97
FFPN15
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor *profit
1 9.25% $100.00 $110.00 $110.00 100.00% $16.50
2 -2.89% $132.00 $125.40 $125.40 100.00% $18.81
3 9.25% $133.76 $127.07 $127.07 100.00% $19.06
4 -3 9.31% $152.49 $144.86 $144.86 100.00% $21 .73
5 -56.30% $96.57 $91 .75 $91 .75 100.00% $13.76
6 -51 .44% $44.04 $41 .84 $41 .84 100.00% $6.28
7 -100.00% $22.31 $21 .20 $21 .20 100.00% $3.18
FFPR10



















































ar NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor *prof it
1 44.40% $50.00 $55.00 $55.00 100.00% $7.70
2 80.50% $88.00 $83.60 $83.60 100.00% $1 1 .70
3 -27.80% $167.20 $158.84 $158.84 100.00% $22.24
4 -27.80% $127.07 $120.72 $120.72 100.00% $16.90
5 -27.80% $96.57 $91 .75 $91 .75 100.00% $12.84
6 -71 .12% $73.40 $69.73 $69.73 100.00% $9.76
7 -100.00% $22.31 $21 .20 $21 .20 100.00% $2.97
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FFP CONTRACTS: LRIP, NORMAL, AND RAMP UP PRODUCTION
FFPR15
ar Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 100.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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2 5 10 0.07.
3 10 20 0.0%
4 20 20 0.0%
5 30 150.0%
6 30 10 0.0%
FPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FL92
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 5 ERR 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.0 0% 9.0 0% 80.0 0% 95.0 0%
20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
25 83.3% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
FL122
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 5 ERR 20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.0 0% 12.0 0% 8 0.0 0% 95.0 0%
20.00-% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
20.00% 12.00% 30.00% 95.00%
20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
FL152
2 5 10 0.0%





Year Qt %changeQt costshare p ro f ] i t% 1 earn i ng budget
1 5 ERR 20.00% 15.,0 0% 30.00% 95.0 0%
2 5 10 0.0% 20.0 0% 15,,0 0% 30.0 0% 95.00%
3 10 20 0.0% 20.0 0% 15,,0 0% 3 0.00% 95.0 0%
4 20 20 .0% 20.0 0% 15,.0 0% 3 0.0 0% j o . U J /•
5 30 15 0.0% 20.0 0% 15.,0 0% 8 .0 0% "95.0 0%
6 30 10 0.0% 2 0.0 0% 15,.0 0% 8 0.0 0% 95.0 0%
7 25 83.3% 20.00% 15.,0 0% 30.0 0% 95.0 0%
FL93
Year n j.\4 i- %changeQt costshare p ro f i , t% 1 earn i ng budget
1 5 ERR 35.0 0% 9.,0 0% 30.0 0% 95.00%
2 5 10 0.0% 35.0 0% 9,,0 0% 30.00% 95.0 0%
3 10 20 0.0% 35.0 0% 9.,0 0% 80 .0 0% 95.0 0%
4 20 200.0% 35.0 0% 9,,0 0% 8 0.00% 95.0 0%
5 30 150.0% 35.0 0% 9.,0 0% 80.0 0% 95.0 0%
6 30 10 0.0% 35.0 0% 9,,0 0% 30.00% 95.0 0%
7 25 83.3% 35.0 0% 9,,0 0% 80.0 0% 95.0 0%
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FPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FL92
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCf actor INCFEE
1 -1 .637. $50,,00 $66.00 $55.00 120.007. ($2.20)
2 16.737. $52,.80 $60. 19 $50. 16 120.007. ($2.0 1;
3 16.737. $96,,31 $109.79 $91 .49 120.0 07. ($3.66)
4 7.557. $175,.66 $200.26 $166.38 120.007. ( $6.68)
5 -1 .637. $240 , 31 $273.95 $228.29 120.0 07. ($9.13)
6 -4.697. $219. . 15 $249.84 $203.20 120.0 07. ( $3.33)
7 -20.007. $166,,56 $189.88 $158.23 120.0 07. ( $6.33)
FL122
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCf actor INCFEE
1 0.277. $50,,00 $64.63 $55.00 1 17.507. ($1 .93)
2 20.537. $5 1 ,.70 $57.71 $49.12 1 17.507. ($1.72;
3 20.537. $92,.34 $103.07 $87.72 1 17.507. ($3.07)
4 10.4 07. $164,.91 $ 18.4.08 $156.67 1 17.507. ($5.48)
5 0.277. $220,.90 $246.58 $209.86 1 17.507. ( $7.34)
6 -3.117. $197,.26 $220 .20 $187.40 1 17.507. ($6.56)
7 ERR $146,.80 $163.86 $139.46 1 17.507. ($4.88)
FL152
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 2. 177. $50,,00 $63.25 $55.00 1 15.0 07. ( $1 .65)
2 24.337. $50,.60 $55.28 $48.07 1 15.0 07. ($1.44)
3 24.337. $88,,45 $96.63 $84.03 1 15.0 07. ( $2.52)
4 13.257. $ 154 ,.61 $168.91 $ 146.88 1 15.0 07. ($4.41)
5 2. 177. $202,.69 $221 .44 $192.56 1 15.0 07. ( $5.73)
6 - 1 . 53% $ 177, . 15 $193.54 $168.29 1 15.0 07. ($5.05)
7 -20.007. $129,.03 $140.96 $122.57 115.00% ($3.63)
FL93
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TC factor INCFEE
1 -7. 137. $50,.00 $67.57 $55.00 122.86% ( $4.40)
2 20.737. $54,.06 $63. 10 $51 . 36 122.86% ($4.11)
3 20.737. $100 ,.95 $1 17.83 $95.90 122.867. ($7.67)
4 6.8 07. $188,.53 $220.04 $179. 10 122.86% ( $ 14.33)
5 -7. 137. $264,.05 $308. 19 $250.85 122.867. ($20.07)
6 -1 1 .737. $246,.55 $287.77 $234.23 122.867. ( $ 18 .74)
7 -35.0 07. $191 ,.85 $223.92 $182.25 122.867. ($14.58)
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Total Cos Cei 1 ing
1 $4.95 $57,,75 $66 .00
2 $4.75 $52,.91 $60 . 19
3 $8.67 $96,.50 $109 .79
4 $15.81 $176,.02 $200 .26
5 $21 .63 $240,,79 $273 .95
6 $19.72 $219..60 $249 .34
7 $14.99 $166,,90 $189 .88
PL 122
ar *Pro f i t Total Cos Ce i i ing
1 $6 .60 $59,.68 $66 .00
2 $6 .20 $53,.60 $58 .94
3 $11,.08 $95,.73 $105 .26
4 $19 .79 $170 ,.97 $188 ..0
5 $26 .51 $229,.02 $251 .83
6 $23 .67 $204 , 51 $224 .88
7 $17,.62 $152, , 19 $167 .35
FL152
Year *Profit Total Cos Celling
1 $8 , 25 $61 ,.60 $66 .00
2 37,.59 $54 .22 $57 .63
3 $13,,27 $94,.77 $100,.83
4 $23, . 19 $165,.66 $ 176 .25
5 $30,,40 $217, . 18 $231 ,.07
6 $26 ,.57 $189,.82 $201 .95
7 $19.35 $138.25 $147.09
FL93
Year *Profit Total Cos Ceiling
1 $4.95 $55.55 $66.00
2 $4.87 $52.11 $51.63
3 $9.09 $97.32 $115.09
4 $16.97 $131.74 $214.92
5 $23.76 $254.54 $301.02
6 $22.19 $237.68 $281.07
7 $17.27 $184.94 $218.70
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2 5 10 0.0%
3 10 20 0.07.
4 20 2 0.07.
5 30 150.07.
6 30 10 0.07.
7 25 83.37.
FP1F CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FL123
Year Qt %changeQt costshare prot'i t% learning budget
1 5 ERR 35.007. 12.007. 80.007. 95.007.
35.007. 12.007. 80.007. 95.007.
35.0 07. 12.0 07. 80.0 07. 95.0 07.
35.007. 12.007. 80.007. 95.00%
35.0 07. 12.0 07. 80.0 07. 95.0 07.
35.007. 12.00% 80.007. 95.00%
35.0 07. 12.0 07. 3 0.0 07. 95.0 07.
FL1 53
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit?, learning budget
1 5 ERR 35.007. 15.00% 30.007. 95.00%
2 5 100.0% 35.007. 15.00% 30.007. 95.00%
3 10 20 0.07. 35.0 0.7. 15.0 0% 30.0 0% 95.0 0%
4 20 200.0% 35.007. 15.00% 80.007. 95.00%
5 30 150.07. 35.00% 15.00% 30.00% 95.00%
6 30 100.0% 35.00% 15.00% 80.007. 95.007.
7 25 33.37. 35.00% 15.007. 80.007. 95.00%
FL95
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 5 ERR 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 5 100.0% 50.00% 9.00% 30.007. 95.00%
3 10 200.07. 50.007. 9.007. 80.00% 95.00%
4 20 200.0% 50.007. 9.007. 80.00% 95.00%
5 30 150.0% 50.007. 9.00% 30.007. 95.00%
5 30 100.0% 50.007. 9.007. 30.00% 95.00%
7 25 83.3% 50.007. 9.0 07. 80.00% 95.0 0%
FL125
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 ERR 50.00% 12.007. 80.007. 95.007.
50.00% 12.00% 30.007. 95.00%
50.00% 12.007. 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 12.00% 30.007. 95.007.
50.0 07. 12.0 07. 3 0.0 07. 95.0 0%
50.00% 12.007. 30.007. 95.007.
25 83.37. 50.00% 12.007. 80.007. 95.00%
38
2 5 10 0.0%
3 10 200.07.
4 20 20 0.0%
5 30 150.0%
6 30 10 0.07.
FPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FL123
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INC FEE
1 -5.237. $50..00 $66.00 $55.00 120.00% ( $3.85)
2 24.537. $52,.80 $60. 19 $50. 16 120.0 07. ( $3.51 )
3 24.537. $96,.31 $109.79 $91 .49 120.007. ( $6.40)
4 9.657. $175,.66 $200.26 $166.88 120.00% ( $1 1 .68)
5 -5.237. $240,,31 $273.95 $228.29 120.0 07. ($15.98)
6 -10. 197. $219, . 16 $249.84 $208.20 120.00% ($14.57)
7 -35.0 07. $166,,56 $139.88 $158.23 120.0 0% ($11.08)
FLI53
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor I tan » 7?
1 -3.337. $50..00 $64.43 $55.00 117.14% ($3.30)
2 28.337. $51 ,.54 $57.36 $43.96 117. 14% ($2.94)
3 28.337. $91 . 77 $10.2.13 $87 . 18 117.14% ( $5.23)
4 12.5 07. $163,.40 $181 .84 $155.23 117.14% ($9.31
)
5 -3.337. $218,.21 $242.83 $207.30 117.14% ($12.44)
6 -8.617. $194,.26 $216. 18 $184.55 117.14% ($11.07)
7 -35.007. $ 144. , 12 $ 160 .38 $136.91 117. l"4% ($8.21)
FL95
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 -12.637. $50,,00 $72.60 $55.00 132.0 0% ( $8.80 )
2 24.737. $58,.08 $72.83 $55. 18 132.0 07. ( $8.83)
3 24.737. $116,,53 $146. 13 $110.71 13 2.0 07. ($17.71)
4 6.057. • $233.,81 $293.20 $222. 12 132.0 0% ($35.54)
5 -12.637. $351 .,84 $441 .20 $334.24 132.0 07. ($53.48)
6 -18.867. $352..96 $442.61 $335.31 132.0 0% ($53.65)
7 -50.007. $295,,08 $370.03 $280.32 132.0 07. ( 544 .35)
FL125
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 -10.737. $50 , 00 $70.40 $55.00 128.0 07. ($7.70)
2 28.537. $56,.32 $68.49 $53.50 128.0 0% ( %7 . 49)
3 28.537. $109..58 $133.24 $104.10 128.0 07. ($14.57)
4 8.907. $213. , 19 $259.24 $202.53 128.00% ($23.35)
5 -10.737. $311,.09 $378.28 $295.53 128.00% ($41.37)
6 -17.287. $302,.63 $367.99 $287.50 128.0 07. ($40.25)
7 -50.007. $245.,33 $298.32 $233.06 128.0 07. ($32.63)
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Total Cos Cei 1 i ng
1 $6,60 $57,.75 $66 .00
2 $6.34 $52,.98 $60 . 19
3 $1 1 .56 $96,.64 $109 .79
4 $21 .08 $176,.28 $200 .26
5 $28.84 $241 , . 15 $273 .95
6 $26.30 $219,.93 $249 .84
7 $19.99 $167, . 15 $189 .83
FL153
ar *Prof i t Total Cos Cei i ing
1 $8.25 $59,.95 $66 .00
2 $7.73 $53,.76 $58 .76
3 $13.77 $95,.72 $104 ..62
4 $24.51 $170,.43 $186 .28
5 $32.73 $227,.59 $248 .75
6 $29. 14 $202,.62 $221 .46
$21.62 $150.32 $164.30
FL95
ar *Pro i : i t Total Cos Cei 1 :ing
1 $4.,95 $51 , . 15 $66,.00
2 $5.,23 $51 ,.58 $66,.21
3 $10.,49 $103,.48 $132, . 85
4 •$21,,04 $207 .62 $266,.54
5 $31 .,57 $312,.43 $401,.09
6 $31 , 77 $313 .43 $402,.38
7 $26,,56 $262,.03 $336,.39
FL125
Year *Pro;: i t Total Cos Cei 1 ing
i. $6,.60 $53,.90 $66 .00
2 $6,.76 $52,.77 $64 .20
3 $13, . 15 $102,.67 $124 .92
4 $25 .58 $199,.76 $243 .04
5 $37,.33 $291 ,.49 $354 .64
6 $36,.32 $283,.56 $345 .00
7 $29,.44 $229,.87 $279 .68
90




2 5 10 0.0%
3 10 200.0%
4 20 20 0.0%
5 30 150.0%
6 30 10 0.0%
7 25 33.3%
share p ro f i t% 1 earn l ng budget
5 0.0 0% 15. 0% 80 .0 0% 95.0 0%
50.00% 1 5
.
0% 80 .0 0% 95.0 0%
50.0 0% 15. 0% 80 0% 95.0 0%
50.0 0% 15. 0% 80 .0 0% 95.00%
5 0.0 0% 15. 0% 80 .0 0% 95. 0%
50.0 0% 15 0% 80 .00% 95.0 0%
50 .00% 15. 0% 80 0% 95.0 0%
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FPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FL155
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfacicor INCFEE
1 -8.837. $50,.00 $68.20 $55.00 124,.0 0% ( $6.60)
2 32.33% $54,.56 $64.27 $51 .83 124,.0 0% ( $6.22)
3 32.33% $102,.83 $121.14 $97.69 124,.0 0% ($1 1 .72)
4 1 1 .7 5% $193,.82 $228.32 $184.13 124,.0 0% ( $22. 10)
5 -8.83% $273,.99 $322.76 $260.29 124,,0 0% ($31 .23)
6 -15.69% $258,.21 $304. 17 $245.30 i24,.0 0% ($29.44)
7 -50.00% $202,.78 $238.87 $192.64 124,.0 0% ( $23. 12)
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FPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FL155
ar Prof i t Total Cos Ce i 1 l ng
1 $8.25 $56,.65 $66.00
2 $8. 18 $53,.80 $62.20
3 $15.43 $101 ,.40 $1 17.23
4 $29.07 $ 191 , . 1 1 $220.96
5 $41.10 $270, . 15 $312.35
6 $38.73 $254 .59 $294.36
$30.42 $199.94 $231.17
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FPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FN 92
ar Qt 3changeQt costshare p rofit5 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 20.003 9.005 80.005 95.005
2 15 150. Of, 20.003 9.005 80.005 95.005
3 20 133.35 20.003 9.005 80.005 95.005
4 30 150.03 20.003 9.005 80.005 95.003
5 25 83.35 20.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
6 15 60.03 20.005 9.005 80.003 95.005
7 10 66.75 20.005 9.005 80.003 95.005
FN122
ar Qt 5changeQt costshare p rofit5 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 20.005 12.005 80.005 95.003
2 15 150.05 20.003 12.005 80.005 95.003
3 20 133.35 20.005 12.005 80.005 95.003
4 30 150.05 20.003 12.005 80.003 95.003
5 •25 83.35 20.005 12.005 80.003 95.005
6 15 60.05 20.005- 12.005 80.003 95.005
7 10 66.73 20.005 12.005 80.003 95.005
FN152
ar Qt 3changeQt costshare p rofit5 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 20.005 15.005 80.005 95.005
2 15 15 0.05 20.005 15.005 80.005 95.005
3 20 133.35 20.005 15.005 80.005 95.005
4 30 150.03 20.005 15.00 5 80.005 95.005
5 25 83.35 20.003 15.005 80.005 95.005
15 60.03 20.003 15.005 80.005 95.005
7 10 66.73 20.005 15.005 80.005 95.005
FN93








p rofit5 1 earning budget
35.003 9.005 80.003 95.005
35.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
35.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
35.003 9.005 80.005 95.005
35.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
35.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
35.003 9.005 80.003 95.005
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FPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FN 92
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 7.55?, $100.00 $132.00 $110.00 120.005 ( $4.40)
2 4.4 95 $158.40 $180.58 $150.48 120.005 ($6.02)
3 7.555 $192.61 $219.58 $182.98 120.005 ($7.32)
4 -4.695 $263.50 $300.39 $250.32 120.005 ($10.01)
-8.985 $200.26 $223.29 $190.24 120.005 ( $7.51 )
6 -7.76 5 $109.58 $124.92 $104.10 120.005 ($4.15)
7 -20.005 $65.63 $7 5.95 $63.29 120.005 ($2.53)
FN122
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 10.405 $100.00 $129.25 $1 10.00 1 17.505 ($3.85)
2 7.025 $155.10 $173.13 $147.35 117.505 ( $5.15)
3 10.405 $184.57 $206.14 $175.44 117.505 ($6.14)
4 -3.115 $247.37 $27 6.13 $235.00 117.505 ( $8.23)
5 -7.845 $184.08 $205.48 $174.88 1 17.505 ( $5.12)
6 -6.495 $98.53 $110.10 $93.70 1 17.505 ($3.28)
7 -20.005 $58.72 $6 5.54 $55.78 117.505 ($1 .95)
FM152
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 13.255 $100.00 $126.50 $110.00 1 15.005 ( $3.30)
2 9.56 5 $151 .80 $165.84 $144.21 1 15.005 ( $4.33)
3 13.255 $176.90 $193.26 $163.05 1 15.005 ($5.04)
4 -1 .535 $231 .91 $253.36 $220.32 1 15.00 5 ($5.51
)
5 -6.70 5 $168.91 $184.53 $160.46 1 15.005 ($4.31
6 -5.225 $88.58 $96.77 $84.15 115.005 ( $2.52)
7 -20.005 $51 .51 $56.38 $49.03 1 15.005 ( $1 .47)
FN 9 3
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 6.805 $100.00 $135.15 $1 10.00 122.365 ( $8.80)
2 2.165 $162.18 $189.29 $154.07 122.865 ($12.33)
3 6.805 $201 .91 $235.66 $191 .81 122.865 ($15.35)
4 -1 1 .785 $282.79 $330.06 $26 8.65 122.86 5 ($21 .49)
5 -18.285 $220.04 $256.83 $209.04 122.865 ($16.73)
6 -16.425 $123.28 $143.88 $117.11 122.865 ($9.37)
7 -35.005 $76.74 $89.57 $72.90 122.865 ($5.83)
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FPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FN 92
Year *Profit Total Cost Ceiling
1 $9.90 $115.50 $132.00
2 $13.54 $158.00 $180.58
3 $15.^7 $192.13 $219.58
4 $22.53 $262.84 $300.39
5 $17.12 $199.76 $228.29
6 $9.37 $109.31 $124.92
7 $5.70 $66.46 $75.95
FN122
Year *Profit Total Cost Ceiling
1 $13.20 $119.35 $132.00
2 $17.68 $159.87 $176.81
3 $21.05 $190.35 $210.53
4 $28.20 $254.98 $282.00
5 $20.99 $189.74 $209.86
5 $11.24 $101.66 $112.44
7 $6.69 $60.52 $65.94
FN152
Year *Profit Total Cost Ceiling
1 $15.50 $123.20 $132.00
2 $21.63 $161.52 $173.05
3 $25.21 $188.22 $201.56
4 $33.05 $246.76 $254.38
5 $24.07 $179.72 $192.56
6 $12.62 $94.25 $100.98
7 $7.35 $54.91 $58.84
FM93
Year ^Profit Total Cost Ceiling
1 $9.90 $111.10 $132.00
2 $13.87 $155.61 $184.88
3 $17.26 $193.73 $230.17
4 $24.18 $271.33 $322.38
5 $18.81 $211.13 $250.85
6 $10.54 $118.28 $140.54
7 $6.56 $73.63 $87.48
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FPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FN123
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 10 ERR 35. 0% 12 0% 80 .0 0% 95 .0 0%
2 15 150.0% o O 0% 12 .0 0% 80 .0 0% 95 .0 0%
3 20 133.3% 35. 0% 12 0% 80 .0 0% 95 0%
4 30 150 .0% 35 0% 12 0% 80 .0 0% 95 .0 0%
5 25 83.3% 35. 0% 12. 0% 80 .0 0% 95 .0 0%
6 15 60 .0% 35. 0% 12 0% 80 .0 0% 95 0%
7 10 66.7% 35. 0% 12 0% 80 .0 0% 95 07.
FN153
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 10 EI*R 35.00% 15.00% 80 .0 0% 95 0%
2 15 150 . 0% 35.0 0% 15.0 0% 80 .00% 95 0%
3 20 133 .3% 35.0 0-% 15.0 0% 80 .0 0% 95 0%
4 30 150 . 0% 35.0 0% 15.00% 80 .0 0% 95 .0 0%
5 25 83 .3% 35.0 0% 15.0 0% 80 .0 0% 95 0%
6 15 60 . 0% 35.0 0% 15.0 0% 30 .00% 95 . %
7 10 66 .77. 35.0 0% 15.0 0% 30 .0 0% 95 0%
FN95
ar Qt %changeQt costshare p rotit/. i earn l ng ouage t
1 10 ERR 50.00% 9.0 0% 30.0 0% 95.0 0%
2 15 150.0% 50.0 0% 9.0 0% 3 0.0 0% 95. 0%
3 20 133.3% 50.0 0% 9.0 0% 3 0.0 0% 95.0 0%
4 30 15 0.0% 5 0.00% 9.0 0% 8 0.0 0% 95.0 0%
5 25 50 .0 0% 9.0 0% 80.0 0% 95.0 0%
6 15 60.0% 50.00% 9.0 0% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 66.7% 50.00% 9.0 0% 80.00% 95.0 0%
FN125
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 10 ERR 50.0 0% 12.0 07. 80.0 07. 95.0 07.
50.007. 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.007.
50.00% 12.007. 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%








FPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FN123
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCf actor INC FES
1 9.657. $100,,00 $132.00 $110.00 120.0 07. ( $7.70)
2 4.697. $158,.40 $180.58 $150.43 120.0 07. ($10 .53)
3 9.657. $192,,61 $219.58 $182.98 120.0 07. ($12.81 )
4 -10. 197. $263,.50 $300.39 $250.32 120.00% ($17.52)
5 -17. 147. $200,.26 $228.29 $190 .24 120.0 07. ($13.32)
6 -15. 167. $109,.58 $124.92 $10 4.10 120.0 07. ($7.29)
7 -35.0 07. $66,.63 $75.95 $63.29 120.0 0% ($4.43)
FN 1 5 3
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TC factor IMC FEE
1 12.507. $100,,00 $123.85 $110.00 117. 14% ($6.50)
2 7.227. $154,.62 $172.07 $ 146.89 117.14% ($8.31)
3 12.5 07. $183,.54 $20-4.25 $174.37 1 17. 147. ($10.46;
4 -8.617. $245, . 10 $272.76 $232.35 117. 14% ($13.97)
5 -16.0 07. $181 , 84 $202.35 $172.75 117.14% ( $10 .36)
6 -13.897. $97, . 13 $108.09 $92.27 117. 14% ($5.54)
7 -35.0 07. $57,,65 $64. 15 $54.77 1 17. 147. ( $3.29)
FN95
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCf actor INC FEE
1 6.057. $ 100,,00 $145.20 $110.00 132.0 0% ($17.60)
2 -0 . 187. $174,.24 $213.50 $165.53 132.0 0% ($26.48)
3 6.0 57. $233,,06 $292.26 $221 .41 132.0 0% ($35.43)
4 -18.867. $350,.71 $439.30 $333. 18 132.00% ($53.21 •
5 -27.537. $293,,20 $367.67 $278.54 132.0 07.- ( $44.57 )
6 -25.097. $176,.48 $221 .31 $167.66 132.0 07. ($26.83)
7 -5 0.0 07. $118,,03 $14 8.01 $112.13 132.0 07. ($17.94;
FN! 25
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCf actor INC FEE
1 3.907. $10 0,,00 $140.80 $1 10.00 128.0 0% ($15.40)
2 2.367. $168,.96 $205.46 $160.51 128.007. ( $22.47)
3 8.907. $219, . 15 $266.49 $208. 19 128.0 07. ($29. 15)
4 -17.287. $319,.79 $388.86 $303.80 123.0 0% ($42.53)
5 -26.4 47. $259,,24 $315.24 $246.28 128.0 07. ($34.48)
6 -23.827. $151 ,.31 $18.4.0 $143.75 128.0 07. ( $20 .12)
7 -50.007. $98, . 13 $1 19.33 $93.23 128.0 0% ($13.05)
98





1 $13.20 $1 15.50
2 $18.06 $158.00





FN 1 5 3
ar *Prof i t Total Cost
1 $16.50 $1 19.90
2 $22.03 $160. 12






























7 $11.19 $91 .36
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FPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FN155
Year Qt ?changeQt costshare profit? learning budget
1 10 ERR 50.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
15 150.0? 50.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
50.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
50.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
50.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
50.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
10 55.7? 50.00? 15.00? 80.00? 95.00?
3 20 133.3?































































FPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
FN15 5
ar ^Profit Total Cost Ceiling
1 $16.50 $113.30 $132.00
2 $23.32 $160.16 $136.60
3 $29.31 $201 .25 $234.46
4 $41 .43 $284.48 $331 .44
5 $32.54 $223.41 $260.29
6 $18.40 $126.33 $147.18
7 $11 .56 $79.37 $92.47
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FPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
FR92
ar Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 10 0.0% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100. on 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% Q5. 00%
7 10 40.0% 20.00% 9.00% 30.00% 95.00%
FR122
ar Ot %changeQt costshare
;
^rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 20.00% 12.00% 30.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 20.00% 12.00% 30.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 20.00% 12.00% 80.00% 95 .00%
7 10 40.0% 20.00% 12.00% 30.00% 95.00%
FR152
Year Qt %changeQt costshare \:rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 20.00% 15 .00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 20.00% 15.00% 30.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 20.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95 .00%
4 25 100.0% 20.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 20.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 20.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 20.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
FR93
Year Qt %changeQt costshare iDrofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 35.00% 9.00% 30.00% 05.00%
2 10 200.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 05.00%
4 25 100.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 10 0.0% 35.00% 9.00% 30.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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2 10 20 0.07.
3 25 25 0.0%
4 25 10 0.0%
5 25 10 0.0%
5 25 10 0.0%
7 10 4 0.0%
share p ro f :it% i earning budget
35,.0 07. 12.,0 07. 80 .0 0% 95.0 0%
35 .0 07. 12.,0 0% 80.0 0% 95.0 0%
35,.0 0% 12,,0 0% 3 .0 0% 95 . 0%
35,.0 07. 12,,0 0% 30 .00% 95.0 0%
35,.0 07. 12.,0 0% 3 0.0 0% 95.00%
35 .00% 12,,0 0% 30.00% 35.0 0%




co st share p ro;;i t% i earn ing budge t
1 5 ERR 35.0 0% 15.,0 07. 80,.00% 95.0 0%
2 10 20 0.0% 35.00% 15,.0 0% 80 .0 0% 95.0 0%
3 25 25 0.0% 35.0 0% 15,,0 0% 30,.007. 95.00%
4 25 10 0.0% 35.0 0% 15,.0 0% 80 .0 0% 35.00%
5 25 10 0.0% 35.0 0% 15,,0 0% 80,.0 0% 9 5.00%
6 25 10 0.0% 35.0 0% 15,.0 0% 30 .0 0% 95.00%
7 10 4 0.07. 35.0 07. 15.,0 0% 80,.0 0% 95 .0 0%
FR95
ar Qt 7.changeQt costshare p rof i t % 1 earning budge t
1 5 ERR 5 . 0% 9.0 0% 3 0.0 0% 95.0 0%
2 10 200.0% 50 . 0% 9.0 0% 8 0.00 % 95.00%
3 OR 250.0% 5 0.00% 9.0 07. 30 .0 0% 95. 0%
4 25 10 0.07. 50.00% 9.0 07. 80 .0 0% 95.00%
5 25 i . % 50.00% 9.0 07. 3 0.00% 95. 0%
6 25 100 .0% 50.00% 9.0 07. 80.00% 95.0 0%
7 10 4 0.07. 50 .0 07. 9.0 0% 80.00% 95 . 0%
FR125
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 5 ERR 50 .00% 12. 00% 80 .00% 95 . 00%
10 200.0% 50.00% 12.00% 30.00% 95.00%
50.0 0% 12.0 0% 8 0.0 0% 95.0 0%
50.0 07. 12.0 0% 3 0.0 0% 95.0 0%
50.00% 12.00% 30.00% 95.00%
50.00%' 12.007. 30.00% 95.00%
50.00% 12.007. 80.00% 95.00%
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3 25 250.0%
4 25 100 .0%
25 10 0.0%
6 25 100 . 0%
7 10 4 0.07.
FP IF CONTRACT RANP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
FR123
Year N1F C*t Cat Cpt TC factor I NCIEZ
1 24.537. $50,,00 $66.00 $55.00 120.0 0% ($3..85)
2 39.42% $105,,60 $120.38 $100.32 120.00% ($7,.02)
3 -5.23% $240..77 $274.48 $223.73 120.0 0% c$:6.,0 1)
4 -5.23% $219,.58 $250.32 $208.60 120.00% ( $ 14, , o )
5 -5.23% $200 , 26 $228.29 $190 .24 120.00% ($13.,32)
6 -23.0 9% $182,,63 $208.20 $17 3.50 120.00% ($12, , 15)
7 -35.0 0% $66.,63 $75.95 $63.29 120.0 0% ( $4.,43;
FR 1 5 3
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TC factor IXCFz.Z
1 28.33% $50.,00 $64.43 $55.00 117. 14% ($3.,30)
2 44. 17% $103,.08 $ 1 14.71 $97.93 117.14% ($5..87 )
3 -3.33% $229.,43 $255.31 $217.96 117. 14% ($13..08)
4 -3.33% $204,,25 $227.30 $ 194.04 117. 14% ($11.,64)
5 -3.33% $ 181 .,84 $202.35 $172.75 117.14% c$10.,36)
6 -22.33% $ 161 , 88 $ 180 . 15 $153.79 117.14% ($9.,23 j
7 -35.0 0% $57. , 65 $64. 15 $54.77 1'7 11°/1 1 / • 1 4/a ( $3.,29)
FR95
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TC factor incf 1 hdi2d
1 2 4.73% $50 .,00 $72.60 $55.00 132.0 0% ( $8 .,80)
o 43.42% $116, , 15 $145.66 $1 10 .35 132.0 0% ($17.,66)
o
-12.63% $291 , 33 $365.33 $276.76 132.0 0% ($44.,28)
4 -12.63% 5 292,,26 $366.50 $277.65 132.0 0% ( $44.,42)
5 I -_ • O o /• $293.,20 $367.67 $273.54 132.00% ($44. 57)
6 -35.05% $294, , 14 $363 . 85 $279.43 122.0 0% ($44.,71;
7 -50 .00% $118,,03 $143 .01 $112.13 13 2.00% ($17. 9 4 )
FR125
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TC factor INC?~ZZ
i 28.53% $50.,00 $70.40 $55.00 128.0 0% ( $7 . 7 )
2 48. 17% $112,,64 $136.97 $107.01 128.0 0% ($14.,93)
3 -10.73% $273,,94 $333. 1 1 $260 .24 123.00% ($36. 43)
4 -10.73% $266,.49 $324.05 $253. 16 128.0 0% ($35. , 44)
5 -10.73% $259..24 $315.24 $246.28 128.00% ( $34. 48)
5 -34.29% $252, , 19 $306.66 $239.58 128.0 0% ($33.,54)
7 -50.00% $98, . 13 $1 19.33 $93.23 128.0 0% ($13. 05;
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FPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
FR123
















Year *Pro I i t Total Cost Ceiling
1 $8.25 $59.95 $66.00
2 $14.69 $106.74 $117.51
3 $32.69 $237.58 $261 .55
4 $29. 1
1
$21 1 .50 $232.85
5 $25.91 $188.29 $207.30
6 $23.07 $167.63 $ 134 . 55
7 $3.21 $59.69 $65.72
FR95
Year *?rof i t Total Cost Ceiling
1 $4.95 $51.15 "$66.00
2 $9.93 $102.63 $132.42
$24.91 $257.39 $332. 12
A
-t $24.99 $258.21 $333. 13
5 $25.0 7 $259.0 4 $334.24
5 $25. 15 $259.87 $335.3 1
7 $ 10 . 09 $104.23 $ 134 .55
FR125















$91 .36 $1 1 1 .87
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FR155
FPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
ar Qt %changeQt costshare profits 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 50.00% 15.00% 80.00% 05.00%
2 10 200.055 50.00% 15.00% SO. 00% 05.00%
3 25 250.0$ 50.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
n 25 100.0% 50.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
25 100.0% 50.00% 15.00% 80.00% Q5.00%
6 25 100.0% 50.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 50.00% 15.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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FPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
FR155
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor INCFEE
1 32.33? $50,,00 $68.20 $55.00 124.005 ($6.60)
2 52.92?, $109,.12 $128.54 $103.66 124.005 ($12.44)
3 -8.83? $257,.09 $302.85 $244.23 124.005 ($29.31
)
4 -8.837. $242,.28 $285.40 $230.15 124.005 ( $27.62)
5 -8.835 $228,.32 $268.96 $216.91 124.005 ($26.03)
6 -33.535 $215,.17 $253.47 $204.41 124.005 ( $24.53)
7 -50.005 $81 ,.11 $95.55 $77.06 124.005 ($9.25)
110
FPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
FR155
















CPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION
CL62
Year Qt 5changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 20.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
2 5 100.05 20.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
3 10 200.05 20.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
4 20 200.05 20.00 5 6.00 5 80.005 95.005
5 30 150.05 20.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
r 30 100.05 20.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
7 25 83.35 20.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
CL72
Year Qt 5changeQt costshare p rofit5 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 20.005 8.005 80.005 95.005
2 5 100.05 20.005 8.005 80.005 95.005
3 10 200.05 20.005 8.005 80.005 95.005
4 20 200.05 20.005 8.005 80.005 95.005
5 30 150.05 20.005 8.005 80.005 95.005
5 30 100.05 20.005 8.005 80.005 95.005
7 25 83.35 20.005 8.005 80.005 95.005
CL92
Year Qt 5changeQt costshare p rofit5 1 earning budget
1 ERR 20.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
2 5 100.05 20.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
3 10 200.05 20.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
4 20 200.05 20.005 9.00 5 80.005 95.005
5 30 150.05 20.005 9.00 5 80.005 95.005
6 30 100.05 20.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
7 25 83.35 20.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
CL63
Year Qt 5changeQt costshare p rofit5 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 35.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
2 5 100.05 35.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
3 10 200.05 35.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
4 20 200.05 35.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
5 30 150.05 35.005' 6.005 80.005 95.005
6 30 100.05 35.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
7 25 83.35 35.005 6.005 80.005 95.005
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CPIF CONTRACT LOU RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION
CL62
Year MIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 -3.53% $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.38% $1 1 .00
2 12.93% $52,.53 $59.57 $49.90 119.38% $9.98
3 12.93% $95,.31 $108.10 $90.55 119.38% $18.11
4 4.70% $172,.96 $196.15 $164.31 119.38% $32.36
5 -3.53% $235,.38 $266.95 $223.61 119.38% $44.72
6 -6.28% $213,.56 $242.20 $202.88 119.38% $40.5 8
7 -20.00% $161 ,.47 $183.12 $153.39 119.38% $30.60
CL72
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 -2.27% $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 1 19.38% $11 .00
2 15.47% $52,.53 $59.57 $49.90 119.38% $9.98
3 15.47% $95 .31 $108.10 $90.55 119.38% $18.11
4 6.60% $172,.96 $196.15 $164.31 119.38% $32.86
5 -2.27% $235,.38 $266.95 $223.61 119.38% $44.72
6 -5.22% $213,.56 $242.20 $202.88 119.38% $40.5 8












































































































































































CPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION
CL83
Year Qt XchangeQt costshare profits learning budget
1 5 ERR







Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
1 5 ERR 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 5 100.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 10 200.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
n 20 200.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 30 150.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 30 100.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 25 83.3% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
CL65
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1
C
-/ ERR 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 5 100.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 10 200.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 20 200.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 30 150.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 30 100.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 25 83.3% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
CL85
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 5 ERR 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 5 100.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 10 200.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 20 200.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 30 150.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 30 100.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 25 83.3% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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CPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION
CL83
Year NIF C»t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 -7.77% $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.38% $11 .00
2 19.47% $52,.53 $59.57 $49.90 119.38% $9.98
3 19.47% $95,.31 $108.10 $90.55 119.38% $18.11
4 5.85% $172,.96 $196.15 $164.31 119.38% $32.86
5 -7.77% $235,.38 $266.95 $223.61 119.38% $44.72
6 -12.31% $213,.56 $242.20 $202.88 119.38% $40.58
7 -35.00% $161 .47 $183.12 $153.39 1 19.38% $30.68
CL93
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 -7.13% $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.38% $1 1 .00
2 20.73% $52,.53 $59.57 $49.90 119.38% $9.98
3 20.73% $95,.31 $108.10 $90.55 119.38% $18.11
4 6.80% $172,.96 $196.15 $164.31 119.38% $32.86
5 -7.13% $235,.38 $266.95 $223.61 119.38% $44.72
6 -1 1 .78% $213,.56 $242.20 $202.88 119.38% $40.58
7 -35.00% $161 ,.47 $183.12 $153.39 119.38% $30.68
CL65
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 -14.53% $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.38% $1 1 .00
2 20.93% $52,.53 $59.57 $49.90 119.38% $9.98
3 20.93% $95,.31 $10 8.10 $90.55 119.38% $18.11
4 3.20% $172,.96 $196.15 $164.31 119.38% $32.86
5 -14.53% $235,.38 $266.95 $223.61 119.38% $44.72
6 -20.44% $213,.56 $242.20 $202.88 119.38% $40.58
7 -50.00% $161 ,.47 $183.12 $153.39 119.38% $30.68
CL85
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 -13.27% $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.38% $11 .00
2 23.47% $52,.53 $59.57 $49.90 119.38% $9.98
3 23.47% $95,.31 $108.10 $90.55 1 19.38% $18.11
4 5.10% $172,.96 $196,15 $164.31 119.38% $32.86
5 -13.27% $235,.38 $266.95 $223.61 119.38% $44.72
6 -19.39% $213,.56 $242.20 $202.88 119.38% $40.58
7 -50.00% $161
,.47 $183.12 $153.39 119.38% $30.68
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CPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION
CL95
Year Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% learning budget
1 5 ERR 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 5 100.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 10 200.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
H 20 200.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 30 150.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 30 100.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 25 83.3% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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CPIF CONTRACT LOW RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION
CL95
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 -12.63% 550.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.38% $11.00
2 24.73% $52.53 $59.57 $49.90 119.38% $9.98
3 24.73% $95.31 $108.10 $90.55 119.38% $13.11
4 6.05% $172.96 $196.15 $164.31 119.38% $32.36
5 -12.63% $235.38 $266.95 $223.61 119.38% $44.72
6 -18.86% $213.56 $242.20 $202.88 119.38% $40. 58
7 -50.00% $161.47 $183.12 $153.39 119.38% $30.68
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CPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
CN62
Year Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 20.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 15 150.0% 20.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 20 133.358 20.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 30 150. 0% 20.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 •25 83. 37. 20.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 15 60.03 20.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 56.7% 20.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
CN82
Year Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 20.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 15 150.0% 20.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 20 133.3% 20.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 30 150.0% 20.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 83,3% 20.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 15 60.0% 20.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 66.7% 20.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
CN92
Year Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 15 150.0% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 20 133.3% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 30 150.0% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 83.3% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 15 60.0% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 66.7% 20.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
C N6 3
Year ct %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 10 ERR 35.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 15 150.0% 35.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 20 133.3% 35.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 30 150.0% 35.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 83.3% 35.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 15 60.0% 35.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 66.7% 35.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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CPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
CM62
Year MIF C«t Cat Cpt TCfactor M a x F e e
1 4.703 $100.00 $131 .32 $110.00 119.383 $22.00
2 1 .96 3 $157.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.383 $29.94
3 4.70 3 $190.63 $216.19 $181 .10 1 19.383 $36.22
n -6.283 $259.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.383 $49.29
5 -10.123 $196.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -9.023 $106.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.383 $20.29
7 -20.003 $64.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.383 $12 .27
CN82
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 6.603 $100.00 $131 .32 $110.00 1 19.383 $22.00
2 3.6 43 $157.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.383 $29.94
3 6.603 $190.63 $216.19 $181 .10 119.383 $36.22
n -5.223 $259.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.383 $49.29
5 •-9.36 3 $196.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -8.183 $106.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.383 $20.29
7 -20.003 $64.59 $73.25 $61 .36 1 19.383 $12.27
CN92
Year NIF en Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 7.553 $100.00 $131 .32 $1 10.00 119.383 $22.00
2 4.493 $157.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.383 $29.94
3 7.553 $190.63 $216.19 $181.10 119.383 $36.22
4 -4.6 93 $259.43 $294.23 5246.46 119.383 $49.29
5 -8.983 $196.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -7.76 3 $106.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.383 $20.29
7 -20.003 $6 4.59 573.25 $61 .36 119.383 $12.27
CN63
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor M a x F e e
1 3.953 $100.00 $131 .32 $110.00 119.383 $22.00
2 -0.383 $157.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.383 $29.94
3 3.953 $190.63 $216,19 $181 .10 119.383 $36.22
4 -13.363 $259.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.383 $49.29
5 -19.423 $196.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -17.693 $106.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.383 $20.29
7 -35.003 $64.59 $7 3.25 $61 .36 119.383 $12.27
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35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%

























share p rofit% 1 earning budget
35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
share p rofit% 1.earning budget
50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 5.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 5.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
66.7%
share p rofit% ].earning budget
50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% ' 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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CPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
CN83
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor M a x F e e
1 5.85% $100,.00 $131 .32 $110.00 119.38% $22.00
2 1 .31% $157,.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.38% $29.94
3 5.85% $190,.63 $216.19 $181 .10 119.38% $36.22
4 -12.31% $259,.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.38% $49.29
5 -18.66% $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.38% $37.27
6 -16.84% $106,.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.38% $20.29
7 -35.00% $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.38% $12.27
CN93
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 6.80% $100,.00 $131 .32 $110.00 1 19.38% $22.00
2 2.16% $157,.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.38% $29.94
3 6.80% $190,.63 $216.19 $181 .10 119.38% $36.22
4 -1 1 .78% • $259,.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.38% $49.29
5 -18.28% $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.38% $37.27
6 -16.42% $106,.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.38% $20.29
7 -35.00% $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.38% 312.27
CN65
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor ?'\ a x F e e
1 3.20% $100,.00 $131 .32 $110.00 119.33% $22.00
2 -2.71% $157,.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.38% $29.94
3 3.20% $190,.63 $216.19 $181.10 1 19.38% $36.22
4 -20.44% $259,.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.38% 349.29
5 -28.72% $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.38% $37.27
6 -26.36% $106,.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.38% $20.2 9
7 -50.00% $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.33% 312.27
CN85
Year NIF cn Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 5.10% $100 .00 $131 .32 $1 10.00 119.38% 322.00
2 -1 .02% $157 .58 $178.71 $149.70 119.38% $29.94
3 5.10% $190 .63 $216.19 $181 .10 119.38% $36.22
4 -19.39% $259,.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.38% $49.29
5 -27.96% $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.38% $37.27
6 -25.51% $106 .78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.38% $20.29
7 -50.00% $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.38% $12.27
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CPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
CN95
Year Qt 5changeQt costshare profit* learning budget
1 10 ERR 50.005 9.00% 80.005 95.005
2 15 150.05 50.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
50.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
50.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
50.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
50.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
10 56.75 50.005 9.005 80.005 95.005
3 20 133.35
4 30 15 0.05
5 25 83.35
6 15 6 0.05
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CPIF CONTRACT NORMAL PRODUCTION SCHEME
CN95
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 6.05% $100,.00 $131 .32 $110.00 119.38% $22.00
2 -0.18% $157,.58 $178.71 $149.70 119.38% $29.94
3 6.05% $190,.63 $216.19 $181 .10 1 19.38% $36.22
4 -18.86% $259,.43 $294.23 $246.46 119.38% $49.29
5 -27.58% $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.38% $37.27
-25.09% $106,.78 $121 .10 $101 .44 119.38% $20.29
7 -50.00% $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.38% $12.27
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3 $12 .78 $16.30
4 $17 .40 $22.18
5 $13 .15 $16.77
5 $7 .16 $9.13
7 $4 .33 $5.52
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20.003 6.003 80.003 95 .003
20.003 6.003 30.003 95 .003
20.00% 6.003 80.003 95 .003
20.003 6.003 80.003 95 .00 3
20.003 6.003 80.003 95 .00 3
20.003 6.003 80.003 95 .003
20.003 6.003 80.003 95 .003
share p rofit3 1 earning budget
20.003 8.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 8.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 8.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 8.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 8.003 30.003 95.003
20.003 8.003 80.003 95.00 3
20.003 8.003 80.003 95.003
CPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
CR62
















7 10 40.0 3
CR92









Year Qt 3changeQt costshare profit* learning budget
1 5 ERR 35.003 6.003 80.003 95.003
2 10 200.03 35.003 6.003 80.003 95.003
3 25 250.03 35.003. 6.003 80.003 95.003
4 25 100.03 35.003 6.003 80.003 95.003
5 25 100.03 35.003 6.003 80.003 95.003
6 25 100.03 35.003 6.003 80.003 95.003
7 10 40.03 35.003 6.003 80.003 95.003
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20.003 9.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 9.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 9.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 9.003 30.003 95.003
20.003 9.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 9.003 80.003 95.003
20.003 9.003 80.003 95.003
CPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
CR62
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 12.933 $50.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.383 $11 .00
2 21 .173 $105.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.383 $19.96
3 -3.533 $238.29 $270.24 $226.37 119.383 $45.27
4 -3.533 $216.19 $245.19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .08
5 -3.533 $196.15 $222.46 $186.34 1 19.383 $37.27
6 -13.413 $177.97 $201 .83 $169.07 119.383 $33.81
7 -20.003 $6 4.5 9 $73.25 $61 .36 1 19.383 $12.27
CR82
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 15.473 $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.383 $11 .00
2 24.333 $105,.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.383 $19.96
3 -2.273 $238,.29 $270.24 $226.37 119.383 $45.27
4 -2.273 $216,.19 $245.19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .08
5 -2.273 $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -12.913 $177,.97 $201 .83 $159.07 119.383 $33.81
7 -20.003 $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 1 19.383 $12.27
CR92
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 16.733 $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 1 19.383 $11 .00
2 25.923 $105,.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.333 $19.96
3 -1 .633 $238,.29 $270.24 $226.37 1 19.383 $45.27
4 -1.633 $216,.19 $245.19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .03
5 -1 .633 $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -12.653 $177,.97 $201 .83 $169.07 119.383 $33.31
7 -20.003 $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.383 $12.27
CR63
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 16.933 $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.333 $1 1 .00
2 29.923 $105,.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.383 $19.96
3 -9.033 $238,.29 $270.24 $226.37 119.333 $45.27
4 -9.033 $216,.19 $245.19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .08
5 -9.033 $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -24.613 $177,.97 $201 .83 $169.07 119.383 $33.81
7 -35.003 $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 1 19.383 $12.27
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CPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
CR83
ar Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200. OS 35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.05 35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.05 35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 35.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
CR93
Year Qt %changeQt costshare p rofit% 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
25 100.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 9 5.00%
7 10 40.0% 35.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
CR65
Year Ct %changeQt costshare p rofit* 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
I) 25 100.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 50.00% 6.00% 80.00% 95.00%
CR85
Year Qt %changeQt costshare profit% learning budget
1 5 ERR 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 100.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 50.00% 8.00% 80.00% 95.00%
133
CPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
CR83
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor Max Fee
1 19.473 $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.383 $11 .00
2 33.083 $105,.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.383 $19.95
3 -7.77 3 $238,.29 $270.24 $226.37 119.383 $45.27
4 -7.773 $216,.19 $245.19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .08
5 -7.773 $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -24.113 $177,.97 $201 .83 $169.07 119.383 $33.81
7 -35.003 $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.383 $12.27
CR93
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor M a x F e e
1 20.733 $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 1 19.383 $1 1 .00
2 34.573 $105,.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.383 $19.96
3 -7.133 $238,.29 $270.24 $226.37 1 19.383 $45.27
4 -7.133 $216,.19 $245.19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .08
5 -7.133 $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 1 19.383 $37.27
6 -23.853 $177,.97 $201 .83 $169.07 119.383 $33.81
7 -35.003 $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 1 19.383 $12.27
CR65
Year NIF C«t Cat Cpt TCfactor M a x F e e
1 20.933 $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 119.383 $1 1 .00
2 38.673 $105,.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.383 $19.96
3 -14.533 $238,.29 $270.24 $226.37 119.383 $45.27
4 -14.533 $216,.19 $245.19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .08
5 -14.533 $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -35.813 $177,.97 $201 .83 $169.07 119.383 $33.81
7 -50.003 $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 119.383 $12.27
CR85
Year NIF C*t Cat Cpt TCfactor MaxFee
1 23.473 $50,.00 $65.66 $55.00 1 19.383 $11 .00
2 41 .833 $105,.05 $119.14 $99.80 119.383 $19.96
3 -13.273 $238,.29 $270.24 $226.37 119.383 $45.27
4 -13.273 $216,.19 $245.'19 $205.38 119.383 $41 .08
5 -13.273 $196,.15 $222.46 $186.34 119.383 $37.27
6 -35.313 $177,.97 $201 .83 $169.07 119.383 $33.81
7 -50.003 $64,.59 $73.25 $61 .36 1 19.383 $12.27
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CPIF CONTRACT RAMP UP PRODUCTION SCHEME
ar Qt %changeQt costshare p rofitr. 1 earning budget
1 5 ERR 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
2 10 200. or. 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
3 25 250. or, 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
4 25 100.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
5 25 ioo. or, 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
6 25 100.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
7 10 40.0% 50.00% 9.00% 80.00% 95.00%
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